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Abstract
The Great Recession is arguably the most important macroeconomic event of the last
three decades. Prior to the collapse of national output during 2008 & 2009, the United
States experienced a sustained period of good economic outcomes with only two mild and
short recessions.
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In addition to the severity of the recession, several characteristics of this recession signify
it as as a unique event in the recent economic history of the United States. Some of these
unique features include the following:
Large Increase in Uncertainty About the Future: The Great Recession and its sub-
sequent slow recovery have been marked by a large increase in uncertainty about the future.
Uncertainty, as measured by the VIX index of implied stock market volatility, peaked at
the end of 2008 and has remained volatile over the past few years.
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VIX−Implied Uncertainty ShocksMany economists and the financial press believe the large increase in uncertainty may have
played a role in the Great Recession and subsequent slow recovery. For example, Kocher-
lakota (2010) states, “I’ve been emphasizing uncertainties in the labor market. More gener-
ally, I believe that overall uncertainty is a large drag on the economic recovery.” In addition,
Nobel laureate economist Peter Diamond argues, “What’s critical right now is not the func-
tioning of the labor market, but the limits on the demand for labor coming from the great
caution on the side of both consumers and firms because of the great uncertainty of what’s
going to happen next.”
Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates: The Federal Reserve plays a key role in
offsetting the negative impact of fluctuations in the economy. During normal times, the
central bank typically lowers nominal short-term interest rates in response to declines in
inflation and output. Since the end of 2008, however, the Federal Reserve has been unable
to lower its nominal policy rate due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
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Prior to the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve had not encountered the zero lower bound
in the modern post-war period. The zero lower bound represents a significant constraint
monetary policy’s ability to fully stabilize the economy.
Unprecedented Use of Forward Guidance: Even though the Federal Reserve re-
mains constrained by the zero lower bound, the monetary authority can still affect the
economy through expectations about future nominal policy rates. By providing agents in
the economy with forward guidance on the future path of policy rates, monetary policy can
stimulate the economy even when current policy rates remain constrained. Throughout the
Great Recession and the subsequent recovery, the Federal Reserve provided the economy
with explicit statements about the future path of monetary policy. In particular, the central
bank has discussed the timing and macroeconomic conditions necessary to begin raising its
nominal policy rate. Using this policy tool, the Federal Reserve continues to respond to the
state of the economy at the zero lower bound.
Large Fiscal Expansion: During the Great Recession, the United States engaged in a
very large program of government spending and tax reductions.
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
3
3.1
3.2
T r
i l l i
o n
s  
o f
 D
o l
l a
r s
Real Government Spending
The massive fiscal expansion was designed to raise national income and help mitigate the
severe economic contraction. A common justification for the fiscal expansion is the reduced
capacity of the monetary authority to stimulate the economy at the zero lower bound.
Many economists argue that the benefits of increasing government spending are signifi-
cantly higher when the monetary authority is constrained by the zero lower bound.
The goal of this dissertation is to better understand how these various elements con-
tributed to the macroeconomic outcomes during and after the Great Recession. In addition
to understanding each of the elements above in isolation, a key component of this analysis
focuses on the interaction between the above elements. A key unifying theme between all
of the elements is the role in monetary policy. In modern models of the macroeconomy, the
monetary authority is crucial in determining how a particular economic mechanism affects
the macroeconomy. In the first and second chapters, I show that monetary policy plays
a key role in offsetting the negative effects of increased uncertainty about the future. My
third chapter highlights how assumptions about monetary policy can change the impact of
various shocks and policy interventions. For example, suppose the fiscal authority wants
to increase national output by increasing government spending. A key calculation in this
situation is the fiscal multiplier, which is dollar increase in national income for each dollar
of government spending. I show that fiscal multipliers are dramatically affected by the
assumptions about monetary policy even if the monetary authority is constrained by the
zero lower bound.
The unique nature of the elements discussed above makes analyzing their contribution
difficult using standard macroeconomic tools. The most popular method for analyzing dy-
namic, stochastic general equilibrium models of the macroeconomy relies on linearizing the
model around its deterministic steady state and examining the local dynamics around that
approximation. However, the nature of the unique elements above make it impossible to
fully capture dynamics using local linearization methods. For example, the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates often occurs far from the deterministic steady state of the model.
Therefore, linearization around the steady state cannot capture the dynamics associated
with the zero lower bound. The overall goal of this dissertation is to use and develop tools
in computational macroeconomics to help better understand the Great Recession. Each of
the chapters outlined below examine at least one of the topics listed above and its impact in
explaining the macroeconomics of the Great Recession. In particular, the essays highlight
the role of the monetary authority in generating the observed macroeconomic outcomes
over the past several years.
Can increased uncertainty about the future cause a contraction in output and its compo-
nents? In joint work with Susanto Basu, my first chapter examines the role of uncertainty
shocks in a one-sector, representative-agent, dynamic, stochastic general-equilibrium model.
When prices are flexible, uncertainty shocks are not capable of producing business-cycle
comovements among key macroeconomic variables. With countercyclical markups through
sticky prices, however, uncertainty shocks can generate fluctuations that are consistent with
business cycles. Monetary policy usually plays a key role in offsetting the negative impact
of uncertainty shocks. If the central bank is constrained by the zero lower bound, then
monetary policy can no longer perform its usual stabilizing function and higher uncertainty
has even more negative effects on the economy. We calibrate the size of uncertainty shocks
using fluctuations in the VIX and find that increased uncertainty about the future may
indeed have played a significant role in worsening the Great Recession, which is consistent
with statements by policymakers, economists, and the financial press.
In sole-authored work, the second chapter continues to explore the interactions between
the zero lower bound and increased uncertainty about the future. From a positive per-
spective, the essay further shows why increased uncertainty about the future can reduce a
central bank’s ability to stabilize the economy. The inability to offset contractionary shocks
at the zero lower bound endogenously generates downside risk for the economy. This in-
crease in risk induces precautionary saving by households, which causes larger contractions
in output and inflation and prolongs the zero lower bound episode. The essay also examines
the normative implications of uncertainty and shows how monetary policy can attenuate
the negative effects of higher uncertainty. When the economy faces significant uncertainty,
optimal monetary policy implies further lowering real rates by committing to a higher price-
level target. Under optimal policy, the monetary authority accepts higher inflation risk in
the future to minimize downside risk when the economy hits the zero lower bound. In the
face of large shocks, raising the central bank’s inflation target can attenuate much of the
downside risk posed by the zero lower bound.
In my third chapter, I examine how assumptions about monetary policy affect the econ-
omy at the zero lower bound. Even when current policy rates are zero, I argue that assump-
tions regarding the future conduct of monetary policy are crucial in determining the effects
of real fluctuations at the zero lower bound. Under standard Taylor (1993)-type policy rules,
government spending multipliers are large, improvements in technology cause large contrac-
tions in output, and structural reforms that decrease firm market power are bad for the
economy. However, these policy rules imply that the central bank stops responding to the
economy at the zero lower bound. This assumption is inconsistent with recent statements
and actions by monetary policymakers. If monetary policy endogenously responds to cur-
rent economic conditions using expectations about future policy, then spending multipliers
are much smaller and increases in technology and firm competitiveness remain expansion-
ary. Thus, the model-implied benefits of higher government spending are highly sensitive
to the specification of monetary policy.
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Chapter 1
Uncertainty Shocks in a Model of
Effective Demand
1.1 Introduction
Economists and the financial press often discuss uncertainty about the future as an im-
portant driver of economic fluctuations, and a contributor in the Great Recession and
subsequent slow recovery. For example, Diamond (2010) says, “What’s critical right now
is not the functioning of the labor market, but the limits on the demand for labor com-
ing from the great caution on the side of both consumers and firms because of the great
uncertainty of what’s going to happen next.” Recent research by Bloom (2009), Bloom
et al. (2011), Ferna`ndez-Villaverde et al. (2011), Born and Pfeifer (2011), and Gilchrist,
Sim and Zakrajˇsek (2010) also suggests that uncertainty shocks can cause fluctuations in
1
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macroeconomic aggregates. However, most of these papers experience difficulty in generat-
ing business-cycle comovements among output, consumption, investment, and hours worked
from changes in uncertainty. If uncertainty is a contributing factor in the Great Recession
and persistently slow recovery, then increased uncertainty should reduce output and its
components.
In this paper, we show why competitive, one-sector, closed-economy models generally
cannot generate business-cycle comovements in response to changes in uncertainty. Under
reasonable assumptions, an increase in uncertainty about the future induces precautionary
saving and lower consumption. If households supply labor inelastically, then total output re-
mains constant since the level of technology and capital stock remain unchanged in response
to the uncertainty shock. Unchanged total output and reduced consumption together imply
that investment must rise. If households can adjust their labor supply and consumption
and leisure are both normal goods, an increase in uncertainty also induces “precautionary
labor supply,” or a desire for the household to supply more labor for an given level of the
real wage. As current technology and the capital stock remain unchanged, the competitive
demand for labor remains unchanged as well. Thus, higher uncertainty reduces consump-
tion but raises output, investment, and hours worked. This lack of comovement is a robust
prediction of simple neoclassical models subject to uncertainty fluctuations.
We also show that non-competitive, one-sector models with countercyclical markups
2
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through sticky prices can easily overcome the comovement problem and generate simul-
taneous drops in output, consumption, investment, and hours worked in response to an
uncertainty shock. An increase in uncertainty induces precautionary labor supply by the
representative household, which reduces firm marginal costs of production. Falling marginal
costs with slowly-adjusting prices imply an increase in firm markups over marginal cost.
A higher markup reduces the demand for consumption, and especially, investment goods.
Since output is demand-determined in these models, output and employment must fall
when consumption and investment both decline. Thus, comovement is restored, and uncer-
tainty shocks cause fluctuations that look qualitatively like a business cycle. Returning to
Diamond’s (2010) intuition, simple competitive business-cycle models do not exhibit move-
ments in “the demand for labor” as a result of an uncertainty shock. However, uncertainty
shocks easily cause fluctuations in the demand for labor in non-competitive, sticky-price
models with endogenously-varying markups. Thus, the non-competitive model captures
the intuition articulated by Diamond. Understanding the dynamics of the demand for
labor explains why the two models behave so differently in response to a change in uncer-
tainty. Importantly, the non-competitive model is able to match the estimated effects of
uncertainty shocks in the data by Bloom (2009) and Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009), while
the competitive model cannot.
To analyze the quantitative impact of uncertainty shocks under flexible and sticky prices,
we calibrate and solve a representative-agent, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
3
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with nominal price rigidity. We examine uncertainty shocks to both technology and house-
hold discount factors, which we interpret as cost and demand uncertainty. We calibrate our
uncertainty shock processes using the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
(VIX), which measures the expected volatility of the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock index
over the next thirty days. Using a third-order approximation to the policy functions of
our calibrated model, we show that uncertainty shocks can produce contractions in output
and all its components when prices adjust slowly. In particular, we find that increased un-
certainty associated with future demand can produce significant declines in output, hours,
consumption, and investment. Our model predicts that a one standard deviation increase in
the uncertainty about future demand produces a peak decline in output of about 0.2 percent.
Finally, we examine the role of monetary policy in determining the equilibrium effects
of uncertainty shocks. Standard monetary policy rules imply that the central bank usually
offsets increases in uncertainty by lowering its nominal policy rate. We show that increases
in uncertainty have larger negative impacts on the economy if the monetary authority is
constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. In these circumstances, our
model predicts that an increase in uncertainty causes a much larger decline in output and
its components. The sharp increase in uncertainty during the financial crisis in late 2008
corresponds to a period when the Federal Reserve had a policy rate near zero. Thus, we be-
lieve that greater uncertainty may have plausibly contributed significantly to the large and
persistent output decline starting at that time. Our results suggest that about one-fourth
4
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of the drop in output that occurred in late 2008 can plausibly be ascribed to increased
uncertainty about the future.
Our emphasis on the effects of uncertainty in a one-sector model does not mean that
we deprecate alternative modeling strategies. For example, Bloom et al. (2011) examine
changes in uncertainty in a heterogeneous-firm model with convex and non-convex adjust-
ment costs. However, this complex model is unable to generate positive comovement of
the four key macro aggregates following an uncertainty shock. Furthermore, heterogeneous-
agent models are challenging technically to extend along other dimensions. For example,
adding nominal price rigidity for each firm and a zero lower bound constraint on nominal
interest rates would be difficult in the model of Bloom et al. (2011). We view our work
as a complementary approach to modeling the business-cycle effects of uncertainty. The
simplicity of our underlying framework allows us to tackle additional issues that we think
are important for understanding the Great Recession.
1.2 Intuition
This section formalizes the intuition from the introduction using a few key equations that
characterize a large class of one-sector business cycle models. We show that the causal
ordering of these equations plays an important role in understanding the impact of uncer-
tainty shocks. These equations link total output Yt, household consumption Ct, investment
It, hours worked Nt, and the real wage Wt/Pt. The following key equations consist of a
5
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“demand” equation, an aggregate production function, and a static first-order condition for
a representative consumer to maximize utility:
Yt = Ct + It, (1.1)
Yt = F (Kt, ZtNt), (1.2)
Wt
Pt
U1(Ct, 1−Nt) = U2(Ct, 1−Nt). (1.3)
Typical partial-equilibrium results suggest that an increase in uncertainty about the fu-
ture decreases both consumption and investment. When consumers face a stochastic income
stream, higher uncertainty about the future induces precautionary saving by risk-averse
households. Recent work by Bloom (2009) argues that an increase in uncertainty also de-
presses investment, particularly in the presence of non-convex costs of adjustment. If an
increase in uncertainty lowers consumption and investment in partial equilibrium, Equation
(1.1) suggests that it should lower total output in a general-equilibrium model. In a setting
where output is demand-determined, economic intuition suggests that higher uncertainty
should depress total output and its components.
However, the previous intuition is incorrect in a general-equilibrium neoclassical model
with a representative firm and a consumer with additively time-separable preferences. In
this neoclassical setting, labor demand (the partial derivative of Equation (1.2) with respect
to Nt) is determined by the current level of capital and technology, neither of which changes
when uncertainty increases. The first-order conditions for firm labor demand derived from
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Equation (1.2) and the labor supply condition in Equation (1.3) can be combined to yield:
ZtF2(Kt, ZtNt)U1(Ct, 1−Nt) = U2(Ct, 1−Nt). (1.4)
Equation (1.4) defines a positively-sloped “income expansion path” for consumption and
leisure for given levels of capital and technology. If higher uncertainty reduces consumption,
then Equation (1.4) shows that increased uncertainty must increase labor supply. However,
Equation (1.2) implies that total output must rise. A reduction in consumption and an
increase in total output in Equation (1.1) means that investment and consumption must
move in opposite directions.1
In a non-neoclassical setting, especially one with a time-varying markup of price over
marginal cost, Equations (1.1) and (1.3) continue to apply, but Equation (1.4) must be
modified, and becomes:
1
µt
ZtF2(Kt, ZtNt)U1(Ct, 1−Nt) = U2(Ct, 1−Nt) (1.5)
where µt is the markup of price over marginal cost.
In such a setting, Equation (1.1) is causally prior to Equations (1.2) and (1.3). From
Equation (1.1), output is determined by aggregate demand. Equation (1.2) then deter-
mines the necessary quantity of labor input for given values of Kt and Zt. Finally, given Ct
1This argument follows Barro and King (1984). Jaimovich (2008) shows that this prediction may not hold
for certain classes of preferences that are not additively time-separable.
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(determined by demand and other factors), the necessary supply of labor is made consistent
with consumer optimization by having the markup taking on its required value. Alterna-
tively, the wage moves to the level necessary for firms to hire the required quantity of labor,
and the variable markup ensures that the wage can move independently of the marginal
product of labor.
The previous intuition can also be represented graphically using simplified labor supply
and labor demand curves in real wage and hours worked space. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show
the impact of an increase in uncertainty under both flexible prices with constant markups
and sticky prices with endogenously-varying markups. An increase in uncertainty induces
wealth effects on the representative household through the forward-looking marginal utility
of wealth denoted by λt. An increase in the marginal utility of wealth shifts the household
labor supply curve outward. With flexible prices and constant markups, the labor demand
curve remains fixed for a given level of the real wage. In the flexible-price equilibrium, the
desire of households to supply more labor translates into higher equilibrium hours worked
and a lower real wage. When prices adjust slowly to changing marginal costs, however, firm
markups over marginal cost rise when the household increases their labor supply. For a
given level of the real wage, an increase in markups decreases the demand for labor from
firms. Figure 1.2 shows that equilibrium hours worked may fall as a result of the outward
shift in the labor supply curve and the inward shift of the labor demand curve. The relative
magnitudes of the changes in labor supply and labor demand depend on the specifics of
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the macroeconomic model and its parameter values. The following section shows that in a
reasonably calibrated New-Keynesian sticky price model, firm markups increase enough to
produce a decrease in equilibrium hours worked in response to an increase in uncertainty.
1.3 Model
This section outlines the baseline dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that we use
in our analysis of uncertainty shocks. Our model provides a specific quantitative example
of the intuition of the previous section. The baseline model shares many features with the
models of Ireland (2003), Ireland (2011), and Jermann (1998). The model features opti-
mizing households and firms and a central bank that systematically adjusts the nominal
interest rate to offset adverse shocks in the economy. We allow for sticky prices using the
quadratic-adjustment costs specification of Rotemberg (1982). Our baseline model considers
both technology shocks and household discount rate shocks. Both shocks have time-varying
second moments, which have the interpretation of cost uncertainty and demand uncertainty.
1.3.1 Households
In our model, the representative household maximizes lifetime utility given Epstein-Zin
preferences over streams of consumption, Ct, and leisure, 1 − Nt. The household solves
its optimization problem subject to its risk aversion over the consumption-leisure basket σ
and its intertemporal elasticity of substitution ψ. The parameter θV , (1− σ) (1− 1/ψ)−1
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controls the household’s preference for the resolution of uncertainty.2 The household re-
ceives labor income Wt for each unit of labor Nt supplied in the representative intermediate
goods-producing firm. The representative household also owns the intermediate goods firm
and holds equity shares St and one-period riskless bonds Bt issued by representative in-
termediate goods firm. Equity shares pay dividends DEt for each share St owned, and the
riskless bonds return the gross one-period risk-free interest rate RRt . The household divides
its income from labor and its financial assets between consumption Ct and the amount of
financial assets St+1 and Bt+1 to carry into next period. The discount rate of the household
β is subject to shocks via the stochastic process at. Since our model is a standard dynamic
general-equilibrium model without government, any non-technological source of shocks must
come from changes in preferences. Therefore, we interpret changes in the household dis-
count factor as demand shocks hitting the economy.
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility by choosing Ct+s, Nt+s, Bt+s+1,
and St+s+1 for all s = 0, 1, 2, . . . by solving the following problem:
Vt = max
[
at
(
Cηt (1−Nt)1−η
) 1−σ
θV + β
(
EtV 1−σt+1
) 1
θV
] θV
1−σ
subject to its intertemporal household budget constraint each period,
Ct +
PEt
Pt
St+1 +
1
RRt
Bt+1 ≤ Wt
Pt
Nt +
(
DEt
Pt
+
PEt
Pt
)
St +Bt.
2Our main results are robust to using expected utility preferences over consumption and leisure. The use of
Epstein-Zin preferences allows us to calibrate our model using stock market data. Section 1.6.1 explains
the details of our calibration method.
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Using a Lagrangian approach, household optimization implies the following first-order
conditions:
∂Vt
∂Ct
= λt (1.6)
∂Vt
∂Nt
= λt
Wt
Pt
(1.7)
PEt
Pt
= Et
{(
β
λt+1
λt
)(
DEt+1
Pt+1
+
PEt+1
Pt+1
)}
(1.8)
1 = RRt Et
{(
β
λt+1
λt
)}
(1.9)
where λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the household budget constraint. The utility
function specification implies the following stochastic discount factor Mt+1:
Mt+1 ,
(
∂Vt/∂Ct+1
∂Vt/∂Ct
)
=
(
β
at+1
at
)(
Cηt+1 (1−Nt+1)1−η
Cηt (1−Nt)1−η
) 1−σ
θV
(
Ct
Ct+1
)(
V 1−σt+1
Et
[
V 1−σt+1
])1− 1θV
Using the stochastic discount factor, we can eliminate λ and simplify Equations (1.7) - (1.9)
as follows:
1− η
η
Ct
1−Nt =
Wt
Pt
(1.10)
PEt
Pt
= Et

(
β
at+1
at
)(
Cηt+1 (1−Nt+1)1−η
Cηt (1−Nt)1−η
) 1−σ
θV
(
Ct
Ct+1
)(
V 1−σt+1
Et
[
V 1−σt+1
])1− 1θV (DEt+1
Pt+1
+
PEt+1
Pt+1
)
(1.11)
1 = RRt Et

(
β
at+1
at
)(
Cηt+1 (1−Nt+1)1−η
Cηt (1−Nt)1−η
) 1−σ
θV
(
Ct
Ct+1
)(
V 1−σt+1
Et
[
V 1−σt+1
])1− 1θV
 (1.12)
Equation (1.10) represents the household intratemporal optimality condition with respect
to consumption and leisure, and Equations (1.11) and (1.12) represent the Euler equations
for equity shares and one-period riskless firm bonds.
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1.3.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Each intermediate goods-producing firm i rents labor Nt(i) from the representative house-
hold to produce intermediate good Yt(i). Intermediate goods are produced in a monopolis-
tically competitive market where producers face a quadratic cost of changing their nominal
price Pt(i) each period. The intermediate-goods firms own the capital stock Kt(i) for the
economy and face adjustment costs for adjusting its rate of investment. Each firm issues
equity shares St(i) and one-period risk-less bonds Bt(i). Firm i chooses Nt(i), It(i), and
Pt(i) to maximize firm cash flows Dt(i)/Pt(i) given aggregate demand Yt and price Pt of
the finished goods sector. The intermediate goods firms all have the same constant returns-
to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function, subject to a fixed cost of production Φ.
Each intermediate goods-producing firm maximizes discounted cash flows using the house-
hold stochastic discount factor:
max Et
∞∑
s=0
Mt+s
[
Dt+s(i)
Pt+s
]
subject to the production function:
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θµ
Yt ≤ Kt(i)α [ZtNt(i)]1−α − Φ,
and subject to the capital accumulation equation:
Kt+1(i) =
(
1− δ − φK
2
(
It(i)
Kt(i)
− δ
)2)
Kt(i) + It(i)
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where
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−θµ
Yt − Wt
Pt
Nt(i)− It(i)− φP2
[
Pt(i)
ΠPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
Yt
The behavior of each firm i satisfies the following first-order conditions:
Wt
Pt
Nt(i) = (1− α)ΞtKt(i)α [ZtNt(i)]1−α (1.13)
RKt
Pt
Kt(i) = αΞtKt(i)α [ZtNt(i)]
1−α (1.14)
φP
[
Pt(i)
ΠPt−1(i)
− 1
] [
Pt
ΠPt−1(i)
]
= (1− θµ)
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θµ
+ θµΞt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θµ−1
+φPEt
{
Mt+1
Yt+1
Yt
[
Pt+1(i)
ΠPt(i)
− 1
] [
Pt+1(i)
ΠPt(i)
Pt
Pt(i)
]} (1.15)
qt = Et
{
Mt+1
(
RKt+1 + qt+1
(
1− δ − φK
2
(
It+1
Kt+1
− δ
)2
+ φK
(
It+1
Kt+1
− δ
)(
It+1
Kt+1
)))}
(1.16)
1
qt
= 1− φK
(
It
Kt
− δ
)
(1.17)
where Ξt is the marginal cost of producing one additional unit of intermediate good i, and
qt is the price of a marginal unit of installed capital. RKt /Pt is the marginal revenue product
of capital, which is paid to the owners of the capital stock. Our adjustment cost specifica-
tion is similar to the specification used by Jermann (1998) and Ireland (2003), and allows
Tobin’s q to vary over time.
Each intermediate goods firm finances a percentage ν of its capital stock each period with
one-period riskless bonds. The bonds pay the one-period real risk-free interest rate. Thus,
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the quantity of bonds Bt(i) = νKt(i). Total firm cash flows are divided between payments
to bond holders and equity holders as follows:
DEt (i)
Pt
=
Dt(i)
Pt
− ν
(
Kt(i)− 1
RRt
Kt+1(i)
)
. (1.18)
Since the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem holds in our model, leverage does not affect
firm value or optimal firm decisions. Leverage makes the payouts and price of equity more
volatile and allows us to define a concept of equity returns in the model. We use the volatil-
ity of equity returns implied by the model to calibrate our uncertainty shock processes in
Section 1.6.
1.3.3 Final Goods Producers
The representative final goods producer uses Yt(i) units of each intermediate good produced
by the intermediate goods-producing firm i ∈ [0, 1]. The intermediate output is transformed
into final output Yt using the following constant returns to scale technology:
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
θµ−1
θµ di
] θµ
θµ−1
≥ Yt
Each intermediate good Yt(i) sells at nominal price Pt(i) and each final good sells at nominal
price Pt. The finished goods producer chooses Yt and Yt(i) for all i ∈ [0, 1] to maximize the
following expression of firm profits:
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di
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subject to the constant returns to scale production function. Finished goods-producer
optimization results in the following first-order condition:
Yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θµ
Yt
The market for final goods is perfectly competitive, and thus the final goods-producing firm
earns zero profits in equilibrium. Using the zero-profit condition, the first-order condition
for profit maximization, and the firm objective function, the aggregate price index Pt can
be written as follows:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−θµdi
] 1
1−θµ
1.3.4 Monetary Policy
We assume a cashless economy where the monetary authority sets the net nominal interest
rate rt to stabilize inflation and output growth. Monetary policy adjusts the nominal
interest rate in accordance with the following rule:
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr) (r + ρpi (pit − pi) + ρy∆yt) , (1.19)
where rt = ln(Rt), pit = ln(Πt), and ∆yt = ln(Yt/Yt−1). Changes in the nominal interest
rate affect expected inflation and the real interest through the Fisher relation ln(Rt) =
ln(EtΠt+1) + ln(RRt ). Thus, we include the following Euler equation for a zero net supply
nominal bond in our equilibrium conditions:
1 = RtEt

(
β
at+1
at
)(
Cηt+1 (1−Nt+1)1−η
Cηt (1−Nt)1−η
) 1−σ
θV
(
Ct
Ct+1
)(
Vt+1
Et
[
V 1−σt+1
])1− 1θV ( 1
Πt+1
)
(1.20)
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1.3.5 Equilibrium
The assumption of Rotemberg (1982) (as opposed to Calvo (1983)) pricing implies that we
can model our production sector as a single representative intermediate goods-producing
firm. In the symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate goods firms choose the same price
Pt(i) = Pt, employ the same amount of labor Nt(i) = Nt, and choose to hold the same
amount of capital Kt(i) = Kt. Thus, all firms have the same cash flows and payout structure
between bonds and equity. With a representative firm, we can define the unique markup of
price over marginal cost as µt = 1/Ξt, and gross inflation as Πt = Pt/Pt−1.
1.3.6 Shock Processes
In our baseline model, we are interested in capturing the effects of independent changes in
the level and volatility of both the technology process and the preference shock process.
The technology and preference shock processes are parameterized as follows:
Zt = (1− ρz)Z + ρz (Zt−1) + σzt εzt
σzt = (1− ρσz)σz + ρσzσzt−1 + σσ
z
εσ
z
t
at = (1− ρa) a+ ρaat−1 + σat εat
σat = (1− ρσa)σa + ρσaσat−1 + σσ
a
εσ
a
t
εzt and ε
a
t are first moment shocks that capture innovations to the level of the stochastic
processes for technology and household discount factors. We refer to εσ
z
t and ε
σz
t as second
moment or “uncertainty” shocks since they capture innovations to the volatility of the
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exogenous processes of the model. An increase in the volatility of the shock process increases
the uncertainty about the future time path of the stochastic process. All four stochastic
shocks are independent, standard normal random variables.
1.3.7 Solution Method
Our primary focus of this paper is to examine the effects of increases in the second mo-
ments of the shock processes. Using a standard first-order or log-linear approximation to
the equilibrium conditions of our model would not allow us to examine second moment
shocks, since the approximated policy functions are invariant to the volatility of the shock
processes. Similarly, second moment shocks would only enter as cross-products with the
other state variables in a second-order approximation to the policy functions, and thus we
could not study the effects of shocks to the second moments alone. In a third-order approx-
imation, however, second moment shocks enter independently in the approximated policy
functions. Thus, a third-order approximation allows us to compute an impulse response to
an increase in the volatility of technology or discount rate shocks, while holding constant
the levels of those variables.
To solve the baseline model, we use the Perturbation AIM algorithm and software de-
veloped by Swanson, Anderson and Levin (2006). Perturbation AIM uses Mathematica
to compute the rational expectations solution to the model using nth-order Taylor series
approximation around the nonstochastic steady state of the model. We find that a third-
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order approximation to the policy functions is sufficient to capture the dynamics of the
baseline model. As discussed in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2010), approximations higher
than first-order move the ergodic distributions of the endogenous variables of the model
away from their deterministic steady-state values. In the following analysis, we compute
the impulse responses in percent deviation from the ergodic mean of each model variable.
1.4 Calibration and Baseline Results
1.4.1 Calibration
Table 1.1 lists the calibrated parameters of the model. We calibrate the model at a quar-
terly frequency, using standard parameters for one-sector models of fluctuations. Since our
model shares many features with the estimated models of Ireland (2003) and Ireland (2011),
we calibrate our model to match the estimated parameters reported in those papers. We
use the estimates in these papers to calibrate the steady-state volatilities for the technology
and preference shocks, σz and σa. We calibrate the steady-state level of the discount factor
and technology processes a and Z to both equal one. To assist in numerically calibrating
and solving the model, we introduce constants into the period utility function and the pro-
duction function to normalize the value function V and output Y to both equal one at the
deterministic steady state. We choose steady-state hours worked N and the model-implied
value for η such that our model has a Frisch labor supply elasticity of 1. Our calibration
of φK implies an elasticity of the investment-capital ratio with respect to marginal q of 2.0.
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The household IES is calibrated to 0.50, which is consistent with the empirical estimates of
Basu and Kimball (2002). The fixed cost of production for the intermediate-goods firm Φ
is calibrated to eliminate pure profits in the deterministic steady state of the model. Risk
aversion over the consumption and leisure basket σ is set to 60, which is inline with the
estimated values of van Binsbergen et al. (2010) and Swanson and Rudebusch (2012). We
discuss our calibration of the uncertainty shock stochastic processes in depth in Section 1.6.
In the following analysis, we compare the results from our baseline sticky-price calibration
(φP = 160) with a flexible-price calibration (φP = 0).
1.4.2 Uncertainty Shocks & Business Cycle Comovements
Holding the calibrated parameters fixed, we analyze the effects of an exogenous increase
in uncertainty associated with technology or household demand. Figures 1.3-1.4 plot the
impulse responses of the model to a technology uncertainty shock and Figures 1.5-1.6 plot
the responses to a demand uncertainty shock. The results are consistent with the intu-
ition of Section 1.2 and the labor market diagrams in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Uncertainty
from either technology or household demand both enter Equation (1.4) or Equation (1.5)
through the forward-looking marginal utility of wealth. An uncertainty shock associated
with either stochastic process induces wealth effects on the household which triggers pre-
cautionary labor supply. Thus, the responses and time paths for the endogenous variables
look qualitatively similar for both types of uncertainty shocks.
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Households want to consume less and save more when uncertainty increases in the econ-
omy. In order to save more, households optimally wish to both reduce consumption and
increase hours worked. Under flexible prices and constant markups, equilibrium labor supply
and consumption follow the path that households desire when they face higher uncertainty.
On impact of the uncertainty shock, the level of capital is predetermined, the level of the
shock process is held constant, and thus labor demand is unchanged for a given real wage.
Under flexible prices, the outward shift in labor supply combined with unchanged labor
demand increases hours worked and output. After the impact period, households continue
to save, consume less, and work more hours. Since firms owns the capital stock, higher
household saving translates into higher capital accumulation for firms. Throughout the life
of the uncertainty shock, consumption and investment move in opposite directions, which
is inconsistent with basic business-cycle comovements.
Under sticky prices, households also want to consume less and save more when the econ-
omy is hit by an uncertainty shock associated with technology or household demand. On
impact, households increase their labor supply and reduce consumption to accumulate more
assets. With sticky prices, however, increased labor supply decreases the marginal costs of
production of the intermediate goods firms. A reduction in marginal cost with slowly-
adjusting prices increases firm markups. An increase in markups lowers the demand for
household labor and lowers the real wage earned by the representative household. The de-
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crease in labor demand also lowers investment in the capital stock by firms. In equilibrium,
these effects combine to produce significant falls in output, consumption, investment, hours
worked, and the real wage, which are consistent with business-cycle facts. Thus, the desire
by households to work more can actually lead to lower labor input and output in equilibrium.
1.5 Discussion and Connections
1.5.1 Specific Example of General Principle
The differential response of our economy under flexible and sticky prices to uncertainty
fluctuations is a specific instance of the general proposition established by Basu and Kimball
(2005). They show that “good” shocks that cause output to rise in a flexible-price model
generally tend to have contractionary effects in a model with nominal price rigidity. Basu
and Kimball (2005) also show that the response of monetary policy is critical for determining
the equilibrium response of output and other variables. If monetary policy follows a sensible
rule, for example the celebrated Taylor (1993) rule, then the monetary authority typically
lowers the nominal interest rate to offset the negative short-run effects of the shock. Our
results show, however, this effect is not strong enough for standard parameter values. Even
though the monetary authority in our model lowers interest rates when uncertainty rises,
it does not succeed in offsetting the contractionary effects of uncertainty with nominal
rigidities. In keeping with the bulk of the literature, we do not model why the monetary
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policy rule does not react more aggressively to uncertainty in normal times. However, we do
investigate in depth one particular barrier to expansionary monetary policy that is critical
for understanding the Great Recession: the zero lower bound constraint on nominal interest
rates. If uncertainty increases when the monetary authority is unable to lower the nominal
interest rate further because the policy rate is essentially zero, as was the case in late 2008
and early 2009, then the short-run contractionary effect of the “good” shock dominates,
and the equilibrium response of output becomes robustly negative. We explore this issue in
Section 1.7.
1.5.2 Extension to Sticky Nominal Wages
Our exposition so far suggests that the mechanism we have identified works only in the
special case where nominal prices are sticky but wages are flexible. Indeed, our intuition
for the channel through which an increase in uncertainty raises the markup has empha-
sized these two elements. We argued that higher uncertainty induces households to work
at lower wages, the reduction in the wage reduces firms marginal costs, but since their
output prices are fixed, lower marginal costs translate to higher markups, which are con-
tractionary. However, various types of evidence suggests that nominal wages are sticky, not
flexible, especially at high frequencies. At the macro level, Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005) find that nominal wage stickiness is actually more important than nominal
price stickiness for explaining the observed impact of monetary policy shocks. At the micro
level, Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk (2014) find that the wages of individual workers are
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often unchanged for long periods of time (with wages changed, on average, less than once a
year).
In this subsection, we show that our results extend readily to the case where either or both
nominal prices and wages are sticky. Rather than writing down an extended model with two
nominal frictions, we make our point heuristically, using the graphical labor supply-labor
demand apparatus of Section 1.2. As we argued above, if households act competitively in
the labor market:
U2(Ct, 1−Nt) = λtWt, (1.21)
where W is the nominal wage and λ is the shadow value of nominal wealth (the utility value
of the marginal dollar). Assuming firms have market power, cost-minimization implies that
Wt =
Pt
µPt
ZtF2(Kt, ZtNt). (1.22)
Thus,
U2(Ct, 1−Nt)
λtPt
=
1
µPt
ZtF2(Kt, ZtNt), (1.23)
where µPt is the price-markup over marginal cost.
Now assume a new model, where households also have market power, and set wages with
a markup over their marginal disutility of work:
Wt = µWt
U2(Ct, 1−Nt)
λt
(1.24)
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Then,
U2(Ct, 1−Nt)
λtPt
=
1
µWt
1
µPt
ZtF2(Kt, ZtNt) (1.25)
In our labor market diagrams, suppose we replace the labor supply curve with U2(Ct, 1−
Nt)/λtPt. This quantity has the interpretation of being the disutility faced by the house-
hold of supplying one more unit of labor, expressed in units of real goods (the real marginal
cost of supplying labor). On the vertical axis, put the equilibrium level of the real marginal
disutility of work. Note that this ‘supply curve’ is shifted in exactly the same way by uncer-
tainty as the standard labor supply curve of Figures 1.1 and 1.2 – higher uncertainty raises
λ, which shifts the supply curve out. But now the ‘demand curve’ (the right-hand side of
(25)) is shifted by both price and wage markups – only the product of the two matters.
Take the polar opposite of the case we have analyzed so far: Assume perfect competition in
product markets, but Rotemberg wage setting by monopolistically competitive households
in the labor market. Then the price markup is always fixed at 1, but the wage markup
would jump up in response to an increase in uncertainty (since the marginal cost of sup-
plying labor falls but the wage is sticky), making the qualitative outcome exactly the same
as in our current case with only sticky prices and flexible wages. Thus, while introducing
nominal wage stickiness would certainly affect quantitative magnitudes, it would not change
our qualitative results.
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1.5.3 Connections with Existing Literature
Our framework can be used to understand the economic mechanisms at work in some recent
papers in the literature. Recent work by Bloom et al. (2011), Chugh (2010), and Gilchrist,
Sim and Zakrajˇsek (2010) uses flexible-price models to show that shocks to uncertainty
can lead to fluctuations that resemble business cycles. Their modeling approach is to drop
Equation (1.2) and use multi-sector models of production. Follow the insight of Bloom
(2009), the normal industry equilibrium in these models features resource reallocation from
low- to high-productivity firms. Higher uncertainty impedes the reallocation process by
reducing the necessary investment or disinvestment needed to move capital and labor to
higher-productivity uses. These models use multi-sector production and costly factor ad-
justment to transform a change in the expected future dispersion of total factor productivity
(TFP) into a change in the current mean of the TFP distribution.3 This approach may
allow equilibrium real wages, consumption and labor supply to move in the same direc-
tion. However, all three papers experience difficulties in getting the desired comovements,
at least for calibrations that are consistent with steady-state growth. We view these ap-
proaches are complementary to ours since both mechanisms (cyclical markups and cyclical
3This intuition also helps understand the recent work of Bidder and Smith (2012), which embeds stochastic
volatility and preferences for robustness in a business-cycle model. In their setting, an increase in volatility
of technology shocks affects the expected mean of the technology distribution by changing the conditional
worst case distribution of the robustness-seeking agent. In a related paper, Ilut and Schneider (2011)
embed ambiguity-averse agents in the model of Smets and Wouters (2007). They show that exogenous
changes in the agents’ beliefs about the worst-case scenario can produce business-cycle comovements.
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reallocation) could be at work simultaneously. However, we view our approach as a realistic
and tractable alternative, since non-linear heterogeneous-agent models are computationally
difficult to analyze. Our model of time-varying markups allows us to analyze uncertainty
in the same representative-agent DSGE framework used to study other real and monetary
shocks.
A recent paper by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2010) studies the effects of uncertainty in
a small open economy setting, where they directly shock the exogenous process for the real
interest rate. Since a small open economy analysis is effectively done in a partial-equilibrium
framework, they experience no difficulties in getting business-cycle comovements from an
uncertainty shock. As we show, the difficulties come when the real interest rate is en-
dogenous in a general equilibrium framework. In this setting, our mechanism changes the
qualitative predictions of baseline DSGE models, and makes the model predictions consis-
tent with the empirical evidence.
Another recent paper by Gourio (2012) follows Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) and intro-
duces a time-varying “disaster risk” into an otherwise-standard real business cycle. This
shock can be viewed as bad news about the future first moment of technology combined
with an increase in the future dispersion of technology. Thus, a higher risk of disaster
is a combination of a negative news shock and a shock that increases uncertainty about
the future. However, a key difference between Gourio (2012) and our work is that a re-
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alized disaster affects the level of both technology and the capital stock. In our model, a
realized innovation does not affect the level of capital at the impact of the shock. The ad-
ditional assumption in Gourio (2012) implies that an increase in the probability of disaster
directly lowers the risk-adjusted rate of return on capital. In order for investment to fall
when the probability of disaster increases, Gourio must assume an intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (IES) greater than one. With an IES greater than one, the substitution
effect dominates the wealth effect when the probability of disaster increases. The lower
risk-adjusted rate of return on investment induces the household to decrease investment.
Since the return on investment is low, households supply less labor which lowers total out-
put. Since leisure and consumption are normal goods, an increase in risk results in lower
equilibrium output, investment, and hours, but higher equilibrium consumption. For the
reasons we discuss in Section 1.2, his competitive one-sector model is unable to match basic
business-cycle comovements. A key difference is that our mechanism is able to generate
business-cycle comovement with any calibrated value for the IES.
In independent and simultaneous work, papers by Ferna`ndez-Villaverde et al. (2011) and
Born and Pfeifer (2011) examine the role of fiscal uncertainty shocks in a model with nominal
wage and price rigidities. Ferna`ndez-Villaverde et al. (2011) shows that uncertainty regard-
ing future fiscal policy is transmitted to the macroeconomy primarily through uncertainty
about future taxes on income from capital. As we discuss in the introduction, an increase in
uncertainty with nominal rigidities changes markups and creates macroeconomic comove-
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ment. We view this work as highly complementary to our paper. Our work emphasizes the
basic mechanism in a stripped-down model and shows why fluctuations in uncertainty can
create business cycle comovement. These two papers show that the mechanism we iden-
tify can have important economic effects in the benchmark medium-scale model of Smets
and Wouters (2007). Other than sharing a mechanism for generating comovement, these
two papers differ greatly from our work. We focus on technology and demand uncertainty,
rather than policy uncertainty. In addition, we follow a very different calibration strategy,
which we discuss in the next section. The object of our paper is to understand the role of
increased uncertainty in generating the Great Recession and the subsequent slow recovery.
We also analyze the interaction between the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and
uncertainty shocks, which we view as important for understanding the economics of this
period.
1.6 Quantitative Results & Great Recession Application
1.6.1 Uncertainty Shock Calibration
The intuition laid out in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, and the previous qualitative results suggest
that uncertainty shocks can produce declines in output and its components when prices
adjust slowly. This section uses the previous sticky-price model to determine if uncertainty
shocks are quantitatively important for business cycle fluctuations. A related issue is deter-
mining the proper calibration of our shock processes for the uncertainty shocks associated
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with technology and household demand. The transmission of uncertainty to the macroe-
conomy in our model crucially depends on the calibration of the size and persistence of the
uncertainty shock processes. However, aggregate uncertainty shocks are an ex ante concept,
which may be difficult to measure using ex post economic data. To ensure our calibration of
an unobservable process is reasonable, we want our model and uncertainty shock processes
to be consistent with a well-known and observable measure of aggregate uncertainty.
We choose the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) as our observable
measure of aggregate uncertainty due to its prevalence in financial markets, ease of observ-
ability, and the ability to generate a model counterpart. The VIX is a forward-looking
indicator of the expected volatility of the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock index. To match
the frequency of our model, we aggregate an end-of-month VIX series to quarterly frequency
by averaging over the three months in each quarter. The top panel of Figure 1.7 plots our
quarterly VIX series. Using our VIX data series, denoted V Dt , we estimate the following
simple reduced-form autoregressive time series model:
ln(V Dt ) = (1− ρV )ln(V D) + ρV ln(V Dt−1) + σV
D
εV
D
t , ε
V D
t ∼ N(0, 1). (1.26)
The ordinary least squares regression results are V D = 20.4%, ρV = 0.83, and σV
D
= 0.19
with an R2 = 0.68. Using the estimated parameters, we can also compute a series of
VIX-implied uncertainty shocks as the regression residuals divided by the sample standard
deviation. Compared to its sample average of 20.4%, a one standard deviation VIX-implied
uncertainty shock raises the level of the VIX to 24.27%. The bottom plot of Figure 1.7
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shows the time series of the VIX-implied uncertainty shocks. We use this reduced-form
time-series model to ensure a reasonable calibration for our technology and demand uncer-
tainty shocks processes.
We want to create a model concept that is the counterpart to our observable measure of
aggregate uncertainty. Therefore, we compute a model-implied VIX index as the expected
conditional volatility of the return on the equity of the representative intermediate-goods
producing firm. Using the third-order approximation to the policy functions of the model,
we define our model-implied VIX VMt as follows:
VMt = 100 ∗
√
4 ∗ VARt
(
REt+1
)
, (1.27)
where VARt(REt+1) is the quarterly conditional variance of the equity return.4 We annual-
ize the quarterly conditional variance, and then transform the annual volatility units into
percentage points.
Using our model-implied VIX, we calibrate leverage and the uncertainty shock parameters
using a two-step process. Given the other parameters for the model and the unconditional
shock variances σa and σz, we first choose the level of firm leverage such that the uncondi-
tional level of the model-implied VIX at the ergodic mean matches the average level of the
4Technically, the VIX is the expected volatility of equity returns under the risk-neutral measure. In the
model, the results are quantitatively unchanged if we compute the model-implied VIX using the risk-
neutral expectation.
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VIX in the data, 20.4 percent.5 After matching the unconditional level of the model-implied
VIX, we then choose our uncertainty shock parameters such that a one standard deviation
uncertainty shock in our model, to either technology or household demand, generates an
impulse response that closely matches our reduced-form estimate for the actual VIX in the
data. For example, in our calibrated model a one standard deviation uncertainty shock
to technology or household demand produces a 19 percent increase in the model-implied
VIX and has a first-order autoregressive term of 0.83. Conditional on the values of the
endogenous state variables, our model-implied VIX has an AR(1) representation in each of
the two types of uncertainty shocks. Therefore, we are able to closely match the impulse
response of the simple reduced-form model.
1.6.2 Quantitative Impact of Uncertainty Shocks
Figure 1.8 shows the impact of our calibrated uncertainty shock process on the endogenous
variables of the sticky-price model. Section 1.4.2 shows that the responses are qualitatively
similar for both technology and household demand uncertainty shocks. In this section, we
analyze the quantitative differences between technology and household demand uncertainty
shocks. The bottom right plot of Figure 1.8 shows that both uncertainty shocks under
sticky prices produce a similar law of motion in the model-implied VIX, which approxi-
mately matches the reduced-form VIX model. The bottom middle plot of each figure shows
5Since the Modigliani & Miller (1963) theorem holds in our model, the amount of leverage does not affect
firm decisions or firm value.
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that the percentage increase in the volatility of the exogenous shocks to generate the same
movement in the model-implied VIX differs between technology and household demand
shocks. Household preference shocks require a 96 percent increase in volatility to produce
the same movement in the model-implied VIX as a 37 percent increase in the volatility of
technology.
In addition, the quantitative transmission of uncertainty to the macroeconomy differs
greatly between the technology and household demand shocks. A one standard deviation
technology uncertainty shock generates a peak drop in output of less than 0.05 percent.
However, a one standard deviation household demand uncertainty shock produces a peak
drop in output of about 0.17 percent. Much of the quantitative difference in the output
fluctuations originates from the behavior of investment. When the uncertainty about fu-
ture technology increases, higher capital provides a hedge against possible negative shocks
to future marginal costs. This additional substitution effect, which is not present under a
demand uncertainty shock, provides an incentive for the firm to not disinvest in the capital
stock when uncertainty about future technology increases. Accordingly, investment falls by
only a few basis points after a technology uncertainty shock but falls by over 20 basis points
after a demand uncertainty shock. Since capital and labor are complements in production,
the time path of investment implies that equilibrium hours worked also falls by less after a
technology uncertainty shock. Overall, our results suggest that household demand uncer-
tainty shocks can cause quantitatively significant fluctuations in output and its components.
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Our calibration strategy produces general-equilibrium results which are consistent with
the empirical literature on the macroeconomic effects of stock market volatility. Alexopoulos
and Cohen (2009) analyze the effects of stock market volatility on industrial production
using a vector autoregression with a recursive identification scheme. They show that a one
standard deviation increase in the VIX produces a statistically significant decline of output
with a peak decline of approximately 0.25 percent. Our calibrated impulse responses of
demand uncertainty shocks are close to this point estimate and well within its confidence
interval, which provides additional evidence that our calibration strategy is reasonable.
1.6.3 The Role of Uncertainty Shocks in the Great Recession
The previous section shows that uncertainty shocks associated with household demand
have quantitatively significant effects on output and its components. Many economists and
the financial press believe the large increase in uncertainty in the fall of 2008 may have
played a role in the Great Recession and subsequent slow recovery.6 The plot of the VIX
in Figure 1.7 shows a large increase in expected stock market volatility around the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008. In particular, the bottom plot shows a
three and a half standard deviation VIX-implied uncertainty shock during the end of 2008.
In calibrating our model, one standard deviation uncertainty shocks to either household
6For example, Kocherlakota (2010) states, “I’ve been emphasizing uncertainties in the labor market. More
generally, I believe that overall uncertainty is a large drag on the economic recovery.”
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demand or technology generate one standard deviation movements in the model-implied
VIX. Thus, we cannot easily identify or partition the contribution of demand or technology
uncertainty shocks in our model in generating the large change in the VIX in the fall of
2008. However, the utilization-adjusted total factor productivity series of Fernald (2011)
shows very little evidence of stochastic volatility, either during the Great Recession or over
the entire postwar period. Thus, if we assume demand uncertainty shocks explain the bulk
of the movement in the VIX during the fall of 2008, our baseline model predicts that the
increase in uncertainty in the Fall of 2008 should have lowered output by about 0.6 percent.7
This decline in output may seem a small number relative to the size of the output drop in
2008-2009.8 However, as we show in the next section, the assumptions regarding monetary
policy are crucial in determining the effects of changes in uncertainty on the macroecon-
omy. The Fed Funds target rate hit the zero lower bound on December 16, 2008. From then
on, the Fed could no longer offset the contractionary effects of higher uncertainty on the
economy. Under these circumstances, the predicted macroeconomic effects of uncertainty
are substantially larger.
One potential criticism of using our model to determine the role of uncertainty shocks in
7Given the AR(1) law of motion for volatility shocks in our third-order approximation to the policy func-
tions, the impulse responses for the model scale approximately linearly in the size of the uncertainty
shock.
8The CBO estimates that the output gap was -4.6 percent in 2008Q4.
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the Great Recession is that our model lacks a realistic financial sector and abstracts from
financial frictions. Thus, one might argue that what we term an exogenous uncertainty
shock is actually due to a financial crisis. We are quite sympathetic to the idea that a
financial crisis can raise uncertainty, but we believe that it is important to investigate the
full set of channels through which financial market disruptions can affect the macroeconomy.
A financial market disruption, such as the failure of Lehman Brothers in the Fall of 2008,
is a single event which can have multiple effects, just as a war might increase government
expenditure, raise distortionary taxes, and lead to rationing, each of which has different
macroeconomic effects. Recent work by Iacoviello (2011), Gertler and Karadi (2011), and
many others focuses on the first-moment effects of the financial market disruption, such as
a higher cost of capital and tighter borrowing constraints for households and firms. In this
paper, we analyze the likely effects of the concurrent rise in uncertainty and its effect on
the economy during the Great Recession, which are second-moment effects. To analyze this
independent mechanism and the effects of the increase in uncertainty, we choose to model
uncertainty in a simple but reasonable macroeconomic model that abstracts from financial
frictions. Our paper complements other work on the Great Recession, since one could easily
combine the first-moment and second-moment analyses to obtain a complete picture of the
effects of the financial crisis. Adding a detailed financial sector to our model would obscure
the transmission mechanism of uncertainty to the macroeconomy, and we eschew this course
of action for the sake of clarity.
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1.7 Uncertainty Shocks and the Zero Lower Bound
Finally, we examine the role of monetary policy in determining the general-equilibrium
effects of uncertainty shocks. In our model, the monetary authority follows a standard
interest-rate rule that responds to inflation and output growth. The impulse responses in
Figure 1.6 show that the monetary authority aggressively lowers the nominal interest rate
in response to a demand uncertainty shock. However, the calibrated interest rate rule does
not decrease the policy rate enough to offset the negative impact on output and the other
model variables. If the interest rate rule allowed the monetary authority to conduct policy
optimally and replicate the flexible-price equilibrium allocations, then monetary policy could
undo the negative effects of the uncertainty shock. However, if the monetary authority is
constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, then monetary policy cannot
replicate the flexible-price outcome. The sharp increase in uncertainty during the financial
crisis in late 2008 corresponds to a period when the Federal Reserve had a policy rate
near zero. Thus, we believe that the zero lower bound may have plausibly contributed
significantly to the large and persistent output decline starting at that time. We show in
this section that increases in uncertainty have much larger effects on output when monetary
policy is constrained by the zero lower bound. Our results suggest that the second-moment
effects of the financial crisis may be important for understanding the large declines in output
and employment in late 2008 and 2009.
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1.7.1 Solution Method and Calibration
To analyze the impact of the zero lower bound, we solve a modified version of our baseline
model using the policy function iteration method of Coleman (1990). This global approx-
imation method allows us to model the occasionally-binding zero lower bound constraint.
This method discretizes the state variables and solves for the policy functions which satisfy
all the equilibrium conditions of the model. Appendix A.1 contains the details of the pol-
icy function iteration algorithm. To make the model computationally feasible using policy
function iteration, we simplify our baseline model by reducing the number of state variables
and Euler equations. We remove technology shocks and examine only the impact of shocks
associated with household demand. Also, we eliminate two Euler equations by removing
leverage and assuming that households receive firm dividends as a lump-sum payment.
1.7.2 Interactions of Uncertainty and Monetary Policy
In addition to the difficulty of modeling changes in uncertainty at the zero lower bound,
increases in uncertainty can produce an additional source of fluctuations beyond the pre-
cautionary working and saving channel. This additional amplification mechanism, which we
refer to as the contractionary bias, can dramatically affect the economy when uncertainty
increases at the zero lower bound. The contractionary bias emerges from the interaction
of uncertainty and the zero lower bound when monetary policy follows a standard Taylor
(1993)-type policy rule. In this situation, an increase in uncertainty causes an increase
in the average nominal interest rate since the distribution of the nominal interest rate is
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left-truncated by the zero lower bound. For any given level of inflation, a higher nominal
interest rate raises the real interest rate, which discourages consumption and investment
and depress output in economy. In Appendix A.2, we discuss this issue in detail and show
this contractionary bias in the average nominal interest rate can dramatically affect the
economy when uncertainty increases at the zero lower bound. In the main text, however,
we choose to eliminate the contractionary bias mechanism from our results. We view the
contractionary bias channel as a technical consequence of examining changes in uncertainty
at the zero lower bound under a particular simple monetary policy rule, which probably does
not represent the actual conduct of Fed policy at the zero lower bound.9 Note, however,
that since we are removing an amplification mechanism, our results represent a lower bound
on the effects of changes in uncertainty at the zero lower bound. Indeed, if we assumed that
Fed policy follows the same simple Taylor rule at the zero lower bound that it does during
normal times, then we could explain the entire output drop in the Great Recession as being
due to increased uncertainty!
To remove the contractionary bias, we follow the conjecture of Mendes (2011) and as-
sume that the monetary authority implements policy using the following history-dependent
9Our specific model is along the lines of the Fed announcing a loose path of future policy even after the
economy emerges from the zero lower bound, which is something that it has arguably done. We assume
that the expected future path of policy offsets the higher-than-desired nominal interest rates caused
by the zero lower bound. Thus, the average expected nominal interest rate remains unchanged when
uncertainty increases at the zero lower bound.
38
Chapter 1 Uncertainty Shocks in a Model of Effective Demand
monetary policy rule:
rdt = r + ρpi (pit − pi) + (rdt−1 − rt−1) (1.28)
rt = max (0, rdt ) (1.29)
where rdt is the desired policy rate of the monetary authority, and rt is the actual policy
rate subject to the zero lower bound. When the monetary authority is unconstrained by
the zero lower bound, the policy rule in Equation (1.28) responds exactly as a simple Taylor
(1993)-type policy rule. However, when the monetary authority encounters the zero lower
bound, the history-dependent monetary policy rule lowers future desired policy rates to
offset the previous higher-than-desired nominal rates that obtained due to the zero lower
bound. Since deviations from the desired path of the policy rate are offset exactly one-for-
one, the average nominal policy rate remains unchanged when volatility increases. Thus,
the history-dependent monetary policy rule removes the contractionary bias and allow us
to isolate the effects of precautionary saving and working due to uncertainty at the zero
lower bound.
1.7.3 Impulse Response Analysis
Figure 1.9 plots the impulse responses of a one standard deviation uncertainty shock for
our simplified model at the ergodic mean of the model variables. These impulse responses
replicate our previous experiments using this alternative model and calibration. Holding
the level of the discount factor shock constant, an increase in uncertainty about the future
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decreases output by 0.16 percent. In our following analysis of the zero lower bound, we focus
on the relative amount that the zero lower bound amplifies the effects of an uncertainty
shock compared to this impulse response at the ergodic mean.
To compute the impulse response of an uncertainty shock at the zero lower bound, we
generate two time paths for the economy. In the first time path, we simulate a large nega-
tive first moment demand shock, which causes the zero lower bound to bind for about two
years. In the second time path, we simulate the same large negative first moment demand
shock, but also simulate a one-standard-deviation uncertainty shock. We compute the per-
cent difference between the time paths of variables in the two simulations as the impulse
response to the uncertainty shock at the zero lower bound.
Figure 1.9 also shows the impulse response to a one-standard-deviation uncertainty shock
when the economy hits the zero lower bound constraint for two years. At the zero lower
bound, a one standard deviation uncertainty shock produces a 0.35 percent drop in output
on impact, and causes a much larger declines in consumption, investment, and hours worked.
When compared with the impulse response at the ergodic mean, these results suggest that
the zero lower bound more than doubles the decline in output and its components. The
desire by households to work and save more translates into a larger drop in equilibrium hours
worked and investment when the monetary authority cannot adjust its nominal interest
rate. In addition to removing the contractionary bias, simple history-dependent rules like
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Equation (1.28) act as a form of commitment by the monetary authority to keep interest
rates lower after encountering the zero lower bound. This promise of future lower nominal
rates stimulates the economy throughout the zero lower bound episode, but the effect is
not strong enough to prevent significant contractions in output and its components. As the
monetary authority maintains zero policy rates during the beginning of the recovery, output
and its components rise above the ergodic mean impulse responses. As the first moment
demand shock subsides and the economy exits the zero lower bound, the time-paths for
output and its components rebound sharply and closely follow the impulse response at the
ergodic mean.
1.7.4 Revisiting the Role of Uncertainty Shocks in the Great Recession
The impulse responses suggest that adverse effects of uncertainty shocks are amplified at
the zero lower bound. The peak drop in output in response to the uncertainty shock is
about two times larger when the monetary authority is constrained. As we discuss in
Section 1.6.3, the bottom plot of Figure 1.7 shows a three and a half standard deviation
VIX-implied uncertainty shock during the end of 2008. Our larger baseline model, without
accounting for the zero lower bound, suggests that this large uncertainty shock may explain
up to a 0.6 percent drop in output during that period. The results of our zero lower bound
experiments, however, suggest that the zero lower bound amplifies uncertainty shocks by at
least a factor of two. Thus, our results suggest that the increase in uncertainty when the
zero lower bound constraint was binding may have accounted for about a 1.3 percent drop in
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output during the Great Recession. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the gap
between actual and potential output for the fourth quarter of 2008 is negative 4.6 percent.
Our results suggest that a non-trivial fraction of the decline in output during the Great
Recession can be explained by increased uncertainty about the future. Note again that due
to our assumption that monetary policy succeeds in fully offsetting the contractionary bias,
our results are a lower bound on the effects of uncertainty during the recent crisis. We view
our findings as highly complementary to other work on the financial crisis, since our results
can be combined with investigations of other channels through which financial crises affect
the macroeconomy to obtain a complete picture of the Great Recession.
1.7.5 Complexity of Uncertainty at the Zero Lower Bound
Even after our simplifying assumptions, the problem of modeling uncertainty shocks at the
zero lower bound remains computationally intensive in our model. Our alternative model
of this section retains the Epstein-Zin preferences, endogenous capital accumulation, and
stochastic volatility in the discount factor process from our baseline model of Section 1.3.
Many other papers in the zero lower bound literature commonly make one of two sim-
plifying assumptions to reduce the computational burden of the zero lower bound. Some
papers, such as Nakov (2008), Nakata (2013), and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), ex-
amine the zero lower bound in a dynamic and stochastic environment using the textbook
New-Keynesian model of Woodford (2003). This simple model often features only one
exogenous state variable and no endogenous state variables. Other works, such as Erceg
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and Linde´ (2012), use a richer business-cycle model, but rely on a solution technique that
imposes perfect foresight. Our paper shows that the transmission of uncertainty to the
macroeconomy through precautionary saving and working requires capital accumulation,
in a dynamic and stochastic setting where we cannot impose perfect foresight. Therefore,
these two simplifications are inappropriate in our framework and we are required to solve a
computationally more difficult problem.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper examines the transmission mechanism of uncertainty to the macroeconomy in
a standard representative-agent general equilibrium model. Under reasonable assumptions,
fluctuations in uncertainty can generate business cycle-like comovements in output, con-
sumption, investment, and hours worked if nominal prices are sticky (or, more generally, if
markups are countercyclical). We calibrate our model to be consistent with a well-known
and observable index of ex ante stock market volatility. We find that the dramatic increase
in uncertainty during the fall of 2008, combined with the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates, may be an important factor in explaining the large and persistent decline in
output starting at that time.
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Figure 1.1: Flexible Price Model Intuition
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Figure 1.2: Sticky Price Model Intuition
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Table 1.1: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Description Calibrated Value
α Capital’s Share in Production 0.333
β Household Discount Factor 0.9987
δ Depreciation Rate 0.025
φK Adjustment Cost to Changing Investment 20.0
φP Adjustment Cost to Changing Prices 160.0
Π Steady State Inflation Rate 1.0062
ρr Central Bank Interest Rate Smoothing Coefficient 0.50
ρpi Central Bank Reaction Coefficient on Inflation 1.50
ρy Central Bank Reaction Coefficient on Output Growth 0.50
σ Parameter Affecting Household Risk Aversion 60.0
ψ Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution 0.50
θµ Elasticity of Substitution Intermediate Goods 6.0
ρa First Moment Preference Shock Persistence 0.90
ρσa Second Moment Preference Shock Persistence 0.83
σa Steady-State Volatility of Preference Shock 0.02
σσ
a
Volatility of Second Moment Preference Shocks 0.019
ρz First Moment Technology Shock Persistence 0.99
ρσz Second Moment Technology Shock Persistence 0.83
σz Steady-State Volatility of Technology 0.01
σσ
z
Volatility of Second Moment Technology Shocks 0.0037
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Figure 1.3: Impulse Responses of Quantities to Second Moment Technology Shock
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Note: Impulse responses are plotted as percent deviations from their ergodic mean.
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Figure 1.4: Impulse Responses of Prices to Second Moment Technology Shock
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Note: The impulse responses for inflation and interest rates are plotted in annualized percent
deviations from their ergodic mean. All other impulse responses are plotted as percent
deviations from their ergodic mean.
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Figure 1.5: Impulse Responses of Quantities to Second Moment Preference Shock
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Figure 1.6: Impulse Responses of Prices to Second Moment Preference Shock
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Note: The impulse responses for inflation and interest rates are plotted in annualized percent
deviations from their ergodic mean. All other impulse responses are plotted as percent
deviations from their ergodic mean.
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Figure 1.7: VIX and VIX-Implied Uncertainty Shocks
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Figure 1.8: Model-Implied VIX and Uncertainty Shock Calibration
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Figure 1.9: Demand Uncertainty Shock Under History-Dependent Taylor Rule
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Chapter 2
Forward Guidance Under Uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
With the federal funds rate currently near zero, the Federal Reserve cannot further stabilize
the economy by lowering its short-term nominal policy rate. When constrained by the zero
lower bound, research by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Wolman (2005), and others ad-
vocates using expectations about the future conduct of monetary policy to help support the
economy. By committing to expansionary policy in the future, these papers argue that the
central bank can mitigate the contractionary effects of the zero lower bound. In practice,
central banks often refer to this policy tool as providing forward guidance about the future
path of policy. However, much of this previous research relies on models where household
decisions can be summarized by the lifetime path of real interest rates. These models fail to
analyze how households respond to expectations of future monetary policy when they face
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increased uncertainty about the future evolution of the economy. Since the beginning of the
Great Recession, many policymakers and economists have expressed significant uncertainty
about future economic activity. For example, almost all Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) participants recently indicated that their uncertainty about future output growth
is higher than the norm during the previous two decades.1 Motivated by the current en-
vironment of increased uncertainty, this paper examines the ability of forward guidance to
stabilize the economy when the future is more uncertain.
I show that increased uncertainty can reduce the central bank’s ability to stabilize the
economy at the zero lower bound. When the economy hits the zero lower bound, the mon-
etary authority can lower the expected path of real interest rates through expectations
of future expansionary monetary policy. In making their consumption decisions, however,
households care about both the expected path of real interest rates and the conditional
distribution of future consumption. When the economy faces significant uncertainty about
the future, the inability of the monetary authority to offset shocks endogenously generates
higher expected volatility and downside risk for the economy. This increase in risk induces
precautionary saving by households, which implies lower consumption for a given path of
real interest rates. The decreased demand for consumption goods causes larger contractions
in output and inflation when the economy encounters the zero lower bound. In addition,
higher uncertainty can result in a dramatically prolonged zero lower bound episode.
1See page 53 of the Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on July 17, 2012.
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To analyze the quantitiatve impact of uncertainty, I solve a general-equilibrium model
with a zero lower bound constraint on the central bank’s nominal policy rate. I model
increased uncertainty about the future as a higher volatility of the exogenous shocks hitting
the economy. I examine the effects of increased uncertainty about future discount factors
of the representative household, which have the interpretation as uncertainty about future
aggregate demand. Using the model, I simulate various zero lower bound scenarios under
either a low or high uncertainty calibration. My calibration strategy is motivated by the
sub-sample maximum likelihood estimates of Ireland (2011) and Ireland (2003) or implied
stock market volatility. I model the occasionally-binding constraint using the global solu-
tion method of Coleman (1990).
Increased uncertainty about the future both amplifies and propagates adverse fluctua-
tions at the zero lower bound. Using the constant price-level targeting rule of Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003), I simulate a decline in aggregate demand similar to the contraction
during the Great Recession. The model predicts that increased uncertainty generates an
additional 1.0% decline in the output gap and an additional 0.5% decline in inflation. If the
increased uncertainty becomes realized as higher actual shock volatility, the economy expe-
riences significant fluctuations and likely fails to escape the zero lower bound after several
years. Without the higher realized shock volatility, price-level targeting can always fully
stabilize the economy within a short period after the economy hits the zero lower bound.
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Optimal monetary policy under uncertainty responds to the distribution of shocks that
agents expect to hit the economy. Optimal monetary policy implies further lowering real
rates by committing to a higher price-level target when the economy faces significant uncer-
tainty about the future. To implement the optimal policy, the monetary authority commits
to modestly extending its period of zero policy rates after the initial contraction in economic
activity. To minimize the downside risk to the output gap and inflation when the econ-
omy hits the zero lower bound, the monetary authority must accept higher inflation risk
in the future. Thus, the monetary policymaker faces a trade-off between the medium-run
distribution of inflation and the short-run distributions of output and inflation. However,
optimal monetary policy does not fully eliminate the downside risk in the economy posed
by the zero lower bound. Even under optimal policy, the economy may still experience large
fluctuations and fail to escape the zero lower bound for an extended period if the volatility
of shocks hitting the economy is high. In the face of large shocks, raising the central bank’s
inflation target can attenuate much of the downside risk posed by the zero lower bound.
The key parameter in my analysis is the volatility of the demand shocks hitting the
economy. To ensure the reasonableness of my calibration, I simulate the model and com-
pare the distribution of possible outcomes with recent macroeconomic data. I use the
history-dependent interest-rate rule estimated by Gust, Lo´pez-Salido and Smith (2013) as
a description of recent FOMC behavior. After matching the initial conditions at the end
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of 2008, the macroeconomic data since the Great Recession falls within the simulated pre-
diction intervals of the high uncertainty model. Thus, actual data from the U.S. economy
is inline with the distribution of possible outcomes that the representative household uses
in evaluating their decisions. This exercise provides some evidence that the level of uncer-
tainty in the calibrated model is reasonable. The results suggest the combination of higher
volatility and the zero lower bound may play a significant role in explaining the slow recov-
ery of the United States economy. Without higher volatility and the propagation provided
by the zero lower bound, the simple model is unable to generate recessions like the most
recent macroeconomic data.
2.2 Intuition
This section formalizes the intuition from the introduction using several key equations of the
model. For Section 2.2 only, I use Taylor series approximations of these equations to show
how increased uncertainty about the future can affect the central bank’s ability to stabilize
the economy. These approximations provide analytical tractability which is unavailable
when examining the model equations in their original nonlinear form. In Section 2.4, I
show that the intuition from these approximations is consistent with the computational
results using the full nonlinear model.
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2.2.1 Household Consumption Under Uncertainty
The household consumption Euler equation highlights why increased uncertainty about the
future may reduce the central bank’s ability to stabilize the economy at the zero lower bound.
Under constant relative risk aversion utility from consumption, the following equation links
consumption Ct by the representative household to the gross real interest rate RRt :
1 = Et
{
βRRt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ}
, (2.1)
where β is the household discount factor and σ is the risk aversion parameter in the house-
hold’s utility function. Using a second-order Taylor series approximation around the steady
state, Appendix B.1.1 shows Equation (2.1) can be written as follows:
ct = Et ct+1 − 1
σ
(
rrt − rr
)
− 1
2
σVart ct+1 (2.2)
where lowercase variables denote the log of the respective variable, rr is the steady state
net real interest rate, and Vart ct+1 denotes the conditional variance of future consumption.
Iterating Equation (2.2) forward and taking expectations at time t implies the following
solution for current consumption:
ct = − 1
σ
∞∑
i=0
(
Et rrt+i − rr
)
− 1
2
σ
∞∑
j=0
Vart ct+1+j (2.3)
When the economy encounters the zero lower bound, Equation (2.3) shows that the mon-
etary authority can raise household consumption by lowering the expected path of real
interest rates. However, Equation (2.3) also shows that households base their consumption
decisions on both the expected path of real interest rates and the expected conditional
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distribution of future consumption. For any given path of real interest rates, households
consume less if they expect a more volatile distribution of future consumption. To achieve
a given level of consumption, the monetary authority must choose an even lower path for
real rates when households face significant uncertainty about future consumption.
2.2.2 Consumption Uncertainty in General Equilibrium
To illustrate the general-equilbrium effects of the higher-order consumption moments, I
embed the approximated household Euler equation into a simple general-equilbrium model.
Using a simplified version of the model outlined in Section 2.3, Appendix B.1.2 shows how to
derive the following approximate higher-order version of a standard New-Keynesian model:
xt ≈ Et xt+1 − 1
σ
(
rrt − rnt
)
− 1
2
σVart xt+1 (2.4)
rrt ≈ rt − Et pit+1 +
1
2
Vart pit+1 + σCovt
(
xt+1 , pit+1
)
(2.5)
pit ≈ β Et pit+1 + κxt (2.6)
These equations link the output gap xt and inflation rate pit to the nominal interest rate
rt and real interest rate rrt . The output gap xt is the percent deviation of equilibrium out-
put from output in an equivalent economy without nominal price rigidities. Shocks in the
economy cause changes in the natural real interest rate rnt , which is the real interest rate
that would prevail in the equivalent flexible-price economy. Changes in the natural rate can
cause fluctuations in the output gap and inflation.2 The monetary authority can minimize
2For clarity of exposition, Equations (2.4) and (2.5) omit two additional covariance terms which are related
to the exogenous process for the natural rate shocks. The coefficients on these terms are very small and
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these fluctuations by adjusting the nominal interest rate to offset shocks to the natural real
rate. However, the zero lower bound rt ≥ 0 imposes a limit on the central bank’s ability to
offset fluctuations in the natural real rate. When the natural real rate becomes negative,
the monetary authority becomes constrained by the zero lower bound and must rely on
expectations about future monetary policy to help stabilize the economy.
The expected volatility of the natural real rate governs the amount of uncertainty faced
by the economy. Higher expected volatility in rnt makes the future harder to forecast, which
increases the uncertainty about the future. Equation (2.5) augments the standard Fisher
relation rrt = rt − Etpit+1 to include the impact of uncertainty about future inflation and
its expected covariance with future output gaps. Since prices adjust slowly to changing
economic conditions, changes in the nominal interest rate affect the economy by altering
real interest rates. Solving Equations (2.4) and (2.6) forward:
xt = −
∞∑
i=0
(
Et rnt+i − Et rrt+i
)
− 1
2
σ
∞∑
j=0
Vart xt+1+j (2.7)
pit = Et
{ ∞∑
i=0
βiκxt+i
}
(2.8)
Equations (2.7) and (2.8) show that the evolution of the economy is summarized by the ex-
pected paths of real interest rates and the expected conditional variance of the output gap.
The additional consumption risk in the household Euler equations adds the second-order
moments of the output gap to the standard New-Keynesian model.
they do not provide any additional intuition. See Appendix B.1.2 for additional details.
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The transmission of the household consumption risk to the macroeconomy depends cru-
cially on monetary policy’s ability to stabilize the economy. In absence of the zero lower
bound, the monetary authority can always fully stabilize the economy by setting its nominal
policy rate equal to the natural real rate. In this scenario, the conditional variances of the
output gap and inflation are zero since the monetary authority can stabilize the economy in
all future periods. However, suppose the natural real rates becomes negative and the zero
lower bound prevents the central bank from fully stabilizing the economy. Households and
firms internalize this reduced ability to offset future fluctuations at the zero lower bound.
The higher expected volatility affects the economy through two channels. First, Equations
(2.4) and (2.6) show that expectations of future output gap fluctuations depress current
output and inflation for any given path of real interest rates. In addition, Equation (2.5)
shows that a given level of the nominal interest rate and expected inflation are less effective
at lowering the real interest rate if agents expect inflation volatility and correlated fluctu-
ations in the output gap and inflation. When the future is more uncertain, the monetary
authority must further lower the path of nominal and real interest rates to achieve a given
level of the output gap.
2.2.3 Zero Lower Bound and Downside Risk
The intuition discussed thus far suggests that the zero lower bound endogenously gener-
ates a more volatile distribution of future consumption for the representative household.
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In addition to higher expected volatility, however, the asymmetric ability of the central
bank to offset shocks generates negative-skewness in the expected distribution of consump-
tion. While the central bank can fully offset expansionary shocks with higher nominal policy
rates, the zero lower bound implies a constraint on its ability to offset contractionary shocks.
Households internalize this constraint when forming expectations about future consump-
tion. Increased uncertainty amplifies this asymmetry and produces significantly left-skewed
distributions for consumption throughout the zero lower bound episode. Thus, the zero
lower bound endogenously generates downside tail-risk in household consumption. Return-
ing to Equation (2.1), a third-order approximation of the consumption Euler equation can
be written as follows:
ct = Et ct+1 − 1
σ
(
rrt − rr
)
− 1
2
σVart ct+1 +
1
6
σ2 Skewt ct+1, (2.9)
where Skewt ct+1 denotes the conditional skewness of future consumption. Thus, the neg-
ative skewness introduced by the zero lower bound provides an additional mechanism that
further reduces the responsiveness of consumption to real interest rates.
2.2.4 From Intuition to Model Simulations
The intuition of this section argues that increased uncertainty about the future can amplify
adverse fluctuations at the zero lower bound. In the following section, I calibrate and solve
a nonlinear model and show that the simulated zero lower bound scenarios are consistent
with the intuition developed in this section. In addition, I show that the effects of increased
uncertainty in the calibrated model are quantitatively significant. At the zero lower bound,
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the precautionary behavior by households amplifies and propagates shocks and dramatically
prolongs the zero lower bound episode.
2.3 Model
This section outlines the baseline dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that I use
my analysis. The baseline model shares many features with the models of Ireland (2003)
and Ireland (2011). The model features optimizing households and firms and a central
bank that systematically adjusts the nominal interest rate to offset adverse shocks in the
economy. I allow for sticky prices using the quadratic-adjustment costs specification of
Rotemberg (1982). The baseline model considers fluctuations in the discount factor of
households, which have the interpretation as demand shocks.
2.3.1 Households
In the model, the representative household maximizes lifetime expected utility over streams
of consumption Ct and leisure 1−Nt. The household receives labor income Wt for each unit
of labor Nt supplied in the representative intermediate goods-producing firm. The repre-
sentative household also owns the intermediate goods firm and receives lump-sum dividends
Dt. The household also has access to zero net supply nominal bonds Bt and real bonds BRt .
A nominal bond pays the gross one-period nominal interest rate Rt while a real bond pays
the gross one-period real interest rate RRt . The household divides its income from labor and
its financial assets between consumption Ct and the amount of the bonds Bt+1 and BRt+1
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to carry into next period. The discount factor of the household β is subject to shocks via
the stochastic process at. An increase in at induces households to consume more and work
less for no technological reason. Thus, I interpret changes in the household discount factor
as demand shocks for the economy.
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility by choosing Ct+s, Nt+s, Bt+s+1,
and BRt+s+1, for all s = 0, 1, 2, . . . by solving the following problem:
max Et
∞∑
s=0
at+sβ
s
(
Cηt+s(1−Nt+s)1−η
)1−σ
1− σ
subject to the intertemporal household budget constraint each period,
Ct +
1
Rt
Bt+1
Pt
+
1
RRt
BRt+1 ≤
Wt
Pt
Nt +
Bt
Pt
+
Dt
Pt
+BRt .
Using a Lagrangian approach, household optimization implies the following first-order con-
ditions:
ηatC
η(1−σ)−1
t (1−Nt)(1−η)(1−σ) = λt (2.10)
(1− η) atCη(1−σ)t (1−Nt)(1−η)(1−σ)−1 = λt
Wt
Pt
(2.11)
1 = Et
{(
β
λt+1
λt
)(
RtPt
Pt+1
)}
(2.12)
1 = Et
{(
β
λt+1
λt
)
RRt
}
(2.13)
where λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the household budget constraint. Equations
(2.13) - (2.14) represent the household intratemporal optimality conditions with respect to
consumption and leisure, and Equations (2.15) - (2.16) represent the Euler equations for
the one-period nominal and real bonds.
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2.3.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Each intermediate goods-producing firm i rents labor Nt(i) from the representative house-
hold in order to produce intermediate good Yt(i). Intermediate goods are produced in
a monopolistically competitive market where producers face a quadratic cost of changing
their nominal price Pt(i) each period. Firm i chooses Nt(i), and Pt(i) to maximize the dis-
counted present-value of cash flows Dt(i)/Pt(i) given aggregate demand Yt and price Pt of
the finished goods sector. The intermediate goods firms all have access to the same constant
returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function, subject to a fixed cost of production Φ.
Each intermediate goods-producing firm maximizes discount cash flows using the house-
hold stochastic discount factor:
max Et
∞∑
s=0
(
βs
λt+s
λt
)[
Dt+s(i)
Pt+s
]
subject to the production function:
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
Yt ≤ Nt(i)− Φ,
where
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−θ
Yt − Wt
Pt
Nt(i)− φP2
[
Pt(i)
ΠPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
Yt
The first-order conditions for the firm i are as follows:
Wt
Pt
Nt(i) = ΞtNt(i) (2.14)
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φP
[
Pt(i)
ΠPt−1(i)
− 1
] [
Pt
ΠPt−1(i)
]
= (1− θ)
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
+ θΞt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ−1
+φPEt
{(
β
λt+1
λt
)
Yt+1
Yt
[
Pt+1(i)
ΠPt(i)
− 1
] [
Pt+1(i)
ΠPt(i)
Pt
Pt(i)
]}
,
(2.15)
where Ξt is the multiplier on the production function, which denotes the real marginal cost
of producing an additional unit of intermediate good i.
2.3.3 Final Goods Producers
The representative final goods producer uses Yt(i) units of each intermediate good produced
by the intermediate goods-producing firm i ∈ [0, 1]. The intermediate output is transformed
into final output Yt using the following constant returns to scale technology:[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
≥ Yt
Each intermediate good Yt(i) sells at nominal price Pt(i) and each final good sells at nominal
price Pt. The finished goods producer chooses Yt and Yt(i) for all i ∈ [0, 1] to maximize the
following expression of firm profits:
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di
subject to the constant returns to scale production function. Finished goods-producer
optimization results in the following first-order condition:
Yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
Yt
The market for final goods is perfectly competitive, and thus the final goods-producing firm
earns zero profits in equilibrium. Using the zero-profit condition, the first-order condition
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for profit maximization, and the firm objective function, the aggregate price index Pt can
be written as follows:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
2.3.4 Monetary Policy
I assume a cashless economy where the monetary authority sets the one-period net nominal
interest rate rt = log(Rt). Due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, the
central bank cannot lower its nominal policy rate below by zero. In my baseline model, I
assume that the monetary authority sets its policy rate according to the following constant
price-level targeting rule of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003):
rt
(
θ (pt − p∗) + xt
)
= 0, (2.16)
where pt is the log of the price level, p∗ is the constant price-level target of the central bank,
and xt is the gap between current output and output in the equivalent flexible-price economy.
When the zero lower bound does not bind, the monetary authority uses the nominal interest
rate rt to close the output gap-adjusted price level in parenthesis. When the central bank
encounters the zero lower bound, however, the monetary authority cannot perfectly stabilize
the economy using its nominal policy rate. By committing to a stabile price-level in the
long-run, this rule promises to undo any deflation caused by the zero lower bound. By
committing to higher inflation and more expansionary policy in the future, Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003) shows that this policy rule can help mitigate some of the contractionary
effects of the zero lower bound. By committing to a constant price-level target, this rule
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implies a zero percent inflation target for the central bank. In Section 2.6.1, I relax this
assumption and consider a central bank which chooses a two or four percent inflation target.
2.3.5 Shock Processes
Shocks to the discount rate of households are the only exogenous stochastic process in the
baseline model. The stochastic process for these fluctuations is as follows:
at = (1− ρa)a+ ρaat−1 + σaεat (2.17)
Large negative innovations to this process imply a large decline in aggregate demand, which
forces the economy to encounter the zero lower bound. The volatility of the preference shock
σa controls the amount of uncertainty about the future faced by the economy. A higher
expected volatility makes forecasting the future time path of the stochastic process more
difficult. I specify the stochastic process in levels, rather than in logs, to prevent the
volatility σa from impacting average value of at through a Jensen’s inequality effect. In the
model simulations, at always remains significantly greater than zero.
2.3.6 Equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate goods firms choose the same price Pt(i) = Pt
and employ the same amount of labor Nt(i) = Nt. Thus, all firms have the same cash
flows and I define gross inflation as Πt = Pt/Pt−1 and the markup over marginal cost as
µt = 1/Ξt. Therefore, I can model our intermediate-goods firms with a single representative
intermediate goods-producing firm. Since fluctuations in household discount factors do not
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affect the equivalent flexible-price version of my baseline model, I define the output gap
as output in deviation from its deterministic steady state xt = ln(Yt/Y ). In addition, the
gross natural real interest rate that would prevail in the equivalent flexible-price economy
can be defined as Rnt = β
−1at(Etat+1)−1. Thus, shocks to the household discount factor
act as fluctuations in the natural real rate for the economy.
2.3.7 Solution Method
To formally analyze the impact of the zero lower bound, I solve the model using the policy
function iteration method of Coleman (1990) and Davig (2004). This global approximation
method, as opposed to local perturbation methods such as linearization, allows me to model
the occasionally binding zero lower bound constraint. This method discretizes the state
variables on a grid and solves for the policy functions which satisfy all the model equations
at each point in the state space. Appendix B.2 contains the details of the policy function
iteration algorithm.
2.3.8 Calibration
Table 2.1 lists the calibrated parameters of the model. I calibrate the model at quarterly
frequency using standard parameters for one-sector models of fluctuations. Since the model
shares features with the estimated models of Ireland (2003) and Ireland (2011), I calibrate
many of the parameters to match the estimates reported by those papers. To assist in
numerically solving the model, I introduce a multiplicative constant into the production
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function to normalize output Y to equal one at the deterministic steady state. I choose
steady-state hours worked N and the model-implied value for η such that the model has a
Frisch labor supply elasticity of two. Household risk aversion over the consumption-leisure
basket σ is 2. The value for σ implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.5,
which is consistent with the empirical estimates of Basu and Kimball (2002). The fixed cost
of production for the intermediate-goods firm Φ is calibrated to (µ− 1)Y, which eliminates
pure profits in the deterministic steady state of the model.
The crucial parameter in my calibration is the volatility of the preference shock σa, which
controls the amount of uncertainty about the future faced by the economy. I simulate various
zero lower bound scenarios using both a low uncertainty calibration with σa = 0.015,
and a high uncertainty calibration with σa = 0.045. The low uncertainty calibration is
consistent with the maximum likelihood estimates of Ireland (2003) over the post-1979
Great Moderation sample period. When the sample period includes the 2008-2009 Great
Recession, however, Ireland (2011) estimates a much larger value for the volatility of the
preference shock. My calibrated value for the high uncertainty calibration lies slightly below
the estimate of Ireland (2011), but remains inside the standard errors of his estimates. This
calibration strategy aims to model the views of the FOMC participants that uncertainty
about future economic activity is higher than the norm during the previous two decades.
Alternatively, my calibration strategy can also be motivated using implied stock market
volatility. Using a similar model, Basu and Bundick (2012) calibrate changes in uncertainty
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using fluctuations in the VIX volatility index. The increase in uncertainty from the low to
high uncertainty calibration roughly corresponds to a two standard deviation uncertainty
shock, which is a conservative estimate for the increase in uncertainty during the Great
Recession.3
2.3.9 Transmission of Precautionary Saving to Macroeconomy
Before examining the computational results, this section shows how precautionary saving by
households lowers output and inflation in the macroeconomy. As I discuss in the previous
sections, a more volatile and negatively-skewed expected distribution of consumption in-
duces precautionary saving by the representative household. Since consumption and leisure
are both normal goods, lower consumption also induces “precautionary labor supply,” or a
desire for the household to supply more labor for an given level of the real wage. Figure
2.1 illustrates this effect graphically in real wage and hours worked space. Through the
forward-looking marginal utility of wealth denoted by λt, an increase in uncertainty shifts
the household labor supply curve outward through a wealth effect. If prices adjust slowly
to changing marginal costs, however, firm markups over marginal cost rise when the house-
hold increases its desired labor supply. For a given level of the real wage, an increase in
markups decreases the demand for labor from firms. As Basu and Bundick (2012) discuss,
the increase in markups depends crucially on the behavior of the monetary authority. At
3Basu and Bundick (2012) argue that the increase in uncertainty in late 2008 is consistent with over a three
standard deviation uncertainty shock.
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the zero lower bound, the central bank is unable to offset the increase in markups using its
nominal interest rate. When the monetary authority aims to stabilize the economy using
expectations about future policy, the contractionary higher markups reduce output and
inflation throughout the initial recession and recovery. Thus, the higher markups act as
contractionary headwinds in the economy during the zero lower bound episode. In a rea-
sonably calibrated New-Keynesian model, the next section shows that these higher markups
can significantly amplify and propagate adverse fluctuations at the zero lower bound.
2.4 Quantitative Effects of Uncertainty on Forward Guidance
2.4.1 Single Shock Model Responses
To analyze effects of uncertainty on the central bank’s ability to stabilize the economy, I
simulate a large increase in the discount factor of the representative household. This shock
acts like a large decline in aggregate demand and causes the zero lower bound to bind for
several periods. After the initial shock, I assume the economy experiences no further shocks
and the stochastic process for at returns to its steady state value using its autoregressive
law of motion in Equation (2.17). Figure 2.2 plots the model responses under both low and
high levels of uncertainty using the same time path for the discount factor process. The
discount factor shock implies a negative natural real rate of about 6%, which Levin et al.
(2010) argues is consistent with the initial economic contraction during the Great Recession.
The calibrated autoregressive coefficient implies that the natural real interest rate remains
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negative for six quarters following the initial shock.
The constant price-level targeting rule is able to quickly stabilize the economy when
uncertainty is low. After the contractionary shock fades and natural real interest rate be-
comes positive, the central bank maintains a zero nominal policy rate during the economic
recovery. This expansionary policy lowers real interest rates, which stimulates household
consumption and output by firms. Since the central bank commits to the price-level target,
agents in the model fully internalize this future behavior of the monetary authority. This
lower path of real interest rates mitigates much of the fall in output and inflation throughout
the zero lower bound episode. Despite the severe contraction, the monetary authority is
able to quickly stabilize the economy by maintaining a zero policy rate for an additional two
quarters during the recovery. Approximately one year after the deflationary forces subside,
the central bank is able to fully stabilize the output gap and inflation when uncertainty
about the future is low.
Increased uncertainty, however, dramatically affects the ability of the constant price-level
targeting rule to stabilize the economy. As the labor supply and labor demand figures
illustrate, increased uncertainty raises firm markups and lowers equilibrium hours worked.
The model responses show that markups are significantly higher while the natural real
interest rate remains negative. These higher markups depress output and inflation through
the first several periods of the zero lower bound episode. As the contractionary shock fades
73
Chapter 2 Forward Guidance Under Uncertainty
and the monetary authority maintains a zero policy rate, increased uncertainty continues
to induce precautionary behavior by households and higher firm markups. These forces
generate contractionary headwinds in the economy, which worse macroeconomics outcomes
for a given path of real interest rates. As a result, the monetary authority must maintain a
zero nominal policy rate for a substantially longer period to implement the same monetary
policy rule. Even with the additional periods of zero lower rates, the central bank must
implement positive output gaps for an additional three years to generate the necessary
inflation to stabilize the price level. Although the negative natural real rates only lasted six
quarters, the price-level targeting rule takes several years to fully stabilize the economy.
2.4.2 Model Simulations and Downside Risk in the Economy
In the previous zero lower bound scenarios, a single large shock takes the economy to the
zero lower bound and the economy experiences no shocks in the following periods. This
analysis allows for easy illustration of the effects of uncertainty at the zero lower bound.
However, this method does not show the nonlinear effects of higher uncertainty that becomes
realized as higher actual shock volatility. To show the effects of both higher uncertainty and
higher realized volatility, Figure 2.3 plots the simulated model predictions after the economy
encounters the zero lower bound. To generate these responses, I simulate the same initial
shock under both uncertainty calibrations. In the subsequent periods, however, I draw
random shocks from either the low or high uncertainty calibration, respectively. I repeat
this procedure 50,000 times for both the low uncertainty and high uncertainty calibrations.
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Figure 2.3 plots the median response across the simulations and 95% prediction intervals
for each uncertainty calibration.4
The model simulations highlight how increased uncertainty about the future can affect
the ability of the constant price-level targeting rule to stabilize of the economy at the zero
lower bound. Under low uncertainty, the monetary authority can fully stabilize the economy
in about four years and likely exits the zero lower bound in about two years. When the
economy experiences higher realized volatility, however, the model responses show that the
price-level target is much less able to stabilize the economy. Even five years after the initial
decline in aggregate demand, the economy may still experience significant fluctuations in
output and inflation. In roughly half of the simulated scenarios, the economy fails to escape
the zero lower bound after four years. Even if the monetary authority perfectly commits to
stabilizing a theoretically-motivated nominal variable, the economy may experience signif-
icant fluctuations and fail to escape the zero lower bound if the volatility of shocks in the
economy are high.
The simulations at the zero lower bound also highlights a key mechanism in the model. In
particular, Figure 2.3 shows that the simulations for the output gap under high uncertainty
4This exercise is similar to the generalized impulse response advocated by Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996).
However, since I am interested in the levels of the output gap, inflation, and the nominal interest rate, I
do not difference out the simulated paths using a baseline simulation.
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show a distinct negative skewness. This skewness is a result of the asymmetric ability of
the monetary authority to offset shocks at the zero lower bound. While the central bank
can fully offset expansionary shocks with higher nominal nominal policy rates, the zero
lower bound implies a constraint on their ability to offset contractionary shocks. Increased
uncertainty amplifies this asymmetry and produces significantly left-skewed distributions
for expected real activity throughout the zero lower bound episode. Throughout the zero
lower bound episode, agents internalize this constraint on the monetary authority when
forming expectations about future economic activity. Figure 2.4 illustrates this effect by
plotting the expected distributions of outcomes after the economy encounters the zero lower
bound.5 Due to the higher uncertainty and the zero lower bound constraint, households
and firms understand that a highly negative macroeconomic outcome is possible even one
year in the future. As outlined in the Intuition section, this source of downside tail risk
induces the precautionary behavior of households and reduces the ability of the price-level
targeting rule to stabilize the economy.
2.4.3 Optimal Monetary Policy Under Commitment
The monetary authority in my baseline model follows the constant price-level targeting
rule of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). I choose this specification for the central bank
to examine how uncertainty affects the ability of the same monetary policy rule to stabi-
5The expected distributions are computed using a kernel density smoother. A histogram using the raw
simulated data produces similar results.
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lize the economy at the zero lower bound. In this section, I show how an optimal policy
maker under commitment responds when the economy faces significant uncertainty about
the future. Appendix B.3 outlines the optimal policy problem and its associated solution.
Figures 2.5 - 2.7 replicate the previous numerical simulations under the assumption that
monetary policy is conducted optimally under commitment.
When uncertainty is low, the zero lower bound hardly constrains the monetary author-
ity’s ability to stabilize the economy. In response to a single adverse shock, Figure 2.5 shows
that the central bank is able to quickly stabilize the economy by maintaining a brief period
of zero policy rates after the natural rate becomes positive. As Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) discuss, optimal policy commits to a higher price-level target when the economy
encounters the zero lower bound. The increase in expected inflation lowers the path of
real interest rates and induces higher consumption and output during the initial economic
contraction. Even when the economy is continually hit by shocks, Figure 2.6 shows that the
economy facing low uncertainty is fully stabilized and almost always exits the zero lower
bound in about four years. Despite implying different behavior for the price-level target,
Figures 2.3 and 2.6 show that optimal policy and the constant price-level targeting rule
generate similar macroeconomic outcomes when uncertainty is low. Thus, optimal mone-
tary policy is closely approximated by the constant price-level target in a low uncertainty
environment.
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However, the zero lower bound becomes a serious constraint on policy when uncertainty
about the future is high. Optimal monetary policy under commitment implies additional
increases in the price-level target when the economy faces significant uncertainty about the
future. In response to a large contractionary shock, Figure 2.5 shows that the monetary
authority raises its price-level target by an additional 0.2% under increased uncertainty.
To implement the optimal policy, the monetary authority extends its period of zero policy
rates for an additional two quarters after the natural real rate becomes positive. The model
shows that optimal monetary policy under uncertainty depends on the nature of shocks
that agents expect to hit the economy. Even before the economy is hit by larger realized
shocks, optimal monetary policy preemptively responds to the higher expected volatility
by raising its price-level target. Even under optimal policy however, increased uncertainty
generates an additional 0.7% decline in the output gap and a 0.2% drop in inflation after a
single contractionary shock.
Under optimal policy, the monetary authority accepts higher inflation risk in the future
to minimize the downside risk to output and inflation when the economy hits the zero lower
bound. Despite conducting policy optimally, Figure 2.6 shows that the monetary authority
cannot fully stabilize the economy when the volatility of the exogenous shocks is high. In
comparison to the constant price-level target, however, the distributions for one-year ahead
expected inflation in Figure 2.7 are now positively-skewed. By committing to continually
raise its price-level target in response to adverse fluctuations, the monetary authority is
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able to minimize some of the downside risk to short-run output and inflation. Thus, the
monetary policymaker faces a trade-off between the distribution of medium-run inflation
and the distribution of short-run output and inflation when the economy hits the zero lower
bound. However, optimal monetary policy does fully eliminate the downside risk posed
by the zero lower bound. If the volatility of shocks hitting the economy is high, model
simulations show that the economy may still experience large fluctuations and fail to escape
the zero lower bound for an extended period.
2.4.4 A Calibration Check Using Recent Macroeconomic Data
In the previous sections, I show that increased uncertainty about the future can reduce the
central bank’s ability to stabilize the economy at the zero lower bound. A key parameter
in my analysis is the volatility of the demand shocks hitting the economy. Thus, I want to
ensure a reasonable calibration for the demand shock volatility. In this section, I simulate a
version of my baseline model and compare the distribution of possible outcomes with some
recent macroeconomic data since the Great Recession. This exercise allows me to examine
whether the distribution of outcomes the representative household uses in evaluating their
decisions is in line with the recent experience of the U.S. economy. Figure 2.8 plots the
estimated output gap, inflation, and federal funds rate from the end of 2008 to the end of
2012. Since the output gap is difficult to measure precisely, I use the average output gap
as computed by Weidner and Williams (2009) using a variety of methods. To match the
inflation measure in the model, I use the annualized quarterly percent change in the core
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personal consumption expenditures price-index less a two percent inflation target. Since
the end of 2008, the United States economy has experienced a significant period of output
far below potential, relatively stable but below target inflation, and an extended period of
zero nominal policy rates.
To compare the simulated model outcomes with actual macroeconomic data, I need to
specify a more reasonable description of monetary policy. Despite the theoretical motiva-
tions, no central bank explicitly targets the nominal price level. However, recent empirical
evidence suggests that the Federal Reserve’s recent behavior can be described by an interest-
rate rule with significant history-dependence. Using Bayesian likelihood methods, Gust,
Lo´pez-Salido and Smith (2013) argues that the following history-dependent interest-rate
rule can describe recent Federal Reserve behavior:
rdt =
(
1− φr
)
r + φrrdt−1 + φpi
(
pit − pi
)
+ φxxt, (2.18)
rt = max
(
0, rdt
)
, (2.19)
where rdt is the desired policy rate of the monetary authority, and rt is the actual policy rate
subject to the zero lower bound. This history-dependent policy rule is motivated by the
work of Reifschneider and Williams (2000). When the monetary authority is unconstrained
by the zero lower bound, this policy rule responds exactly as a Taylor (1993)-type policy
rule with interest-rate smoothing. However, when the monetary authority encounters the
zero lower bound, the history-dependent rule lowers future desired policy rates to offset the
80
Chapter 2 Forward Guidance Under Uncertainty
previous higher-than-desired nominal rates caused by the zero lower bound. Similar to a
price-level target, the history-dependent rule commits to a lower path of nominal interest
rates after the economy encounters the zero lower bound. Agents fully internalize this future
conduct of policy, which helps attenuate the contractionary effects of the zero lower bound.
I calibrate φr = 0.9, φpi = 0.8, and φx = 0.25, which are in line with the estimates of Gust,
Lo´pez-Salido and Smith (2013).
When volatility in the economy is high, the time-paths for the actual macroeconomic
data fall within the simulated prediction intervals in Figure 2.8. In a similar exercise to
Section 2.4.2, I simulate the model under the low or high uncertainty calibration using the
history-dependent interest-rate rule. However, I calibrate the size of the initial shock such
that both calibrations generates the same estimated output gap as the fourth quarter of
2008. After matching the initial conditions at the end of 2008, the macroeconomic data
since the Great Recession falls within the simulated prediction intervals of the high un-
certainty model. Thus, actual data from the U.S. economy is inline with the distribution
of possible outcomes that the representative household uses in evaluating their decisions.
This exercise provides some evidence that the level of uncertainty in the calibrated model is
reasonable. Through the lens of the model simulations, however, the recent macroeconomic
data is not be the most likely outcome for the economy. Clearly, the model lacks many other
mechanisms which are likely important for fully explaining the dynamics of the economy.
However, the results suggest that volatility and the zero lower bound may be important
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contributors to the slow recovery of the United States economy.
One potential criticism of the previous exercise is that increasing the volatility of the
shocks hitting the economy simply increases the size of the prediction intervals. Thus, the
model could generate any arbitrary outcome from the data by simply increasing the width of
the prediction intervals. Figure 2.9 attempts to address this concern by simulating a version
of the model under high uncertainty but without imposing the zero lower bound. Without
the amplification and propagation mechanism provided by the zero lower bound, the high
volatility economy cannot generate outcomes for inflation and the output gap similar to the
recent data. Without the zero lower bound, I would need to roughly double the volatility of
the high uncertainty calibration to make the recent macroeconomic outcomes fall within the
simulated prediction intervals. Through the lens of a simple model, the results suggest that
both higher volatility and the zero lower bound are jointly necessary to generate simulations
that are consistent with the slow recovery after the Great Recession.
2.5 Discussion and Connections with Existing Literature
2.5.1 Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound
This paper shows that the zero lower bound changes the conditional distribution of con-
sumption when the households face significant uncertainty about the future. This idea is
related to work by Adam and Billi (2006), Nakov (2008), and Billi (2008), which also exam-
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ine the conduct of monetary policy at the zero lower bound. All three papers papers use a
linearized New-Keynesian model, but solve the model using a global solution method where
agents take account of the future shocks expected to hit the economy. Nakov (2008) shows
that higher expected shock volatility causes larger declines in output and inflation even if
monetary policy is optimal under commitment. Recent work by Billi (2008) argues that
price-level targeting can effectively minimize downside risks in the economy. Returning the
intuition from Equation (2.2), household consumption in the first-order linearized model is
based on the expected value of consumption and the current real interest rate. Thus, the
models in these papers are able to capture changes in the conditional mean caused by the
presence of uncertainty at the zero lower bound. However, the models are unable to other
changes in the consumption distribution caused by the zero lower bound. Figures 2.4 and
2.6 show that higher uncertainty about the future affects the conditional mean, variance,
and skewness of the expected distributions at the zero lower bound. Thus, the linearized
model likely underestimates the true effects of uncertainty and downside risks by restricting
the analysis to changes in the conditional mean.
This paper is related to work by Wolman (2005), Nakata (2013), Ferna´ndez-Villaverde
et al. (2012), Braun, Ko¨rber and Waki (2012), Christiano and Eichenbaum (2012), Gust,
Lo´pez-Salido and Smith (2013), and Judd, Maliar and Maliar (2012), which also solve a
nonlinear New-Keynesian model with a zero lower bound constraint. These papers are
complementary to this study as they examine a different set of economic questions. This
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study is closest to Nakata (2013), which studies optimal government spending and monetary
policy at the zero lower bound. Nakata compares a deterministic economy (σa = 0) to an
economy with uncertainty (σa > 0) and shows that optimal government spending under
discretion increases when the economy faces uncertainty about the future. While Nakata
(2013) and I use a similar model of households and firms, his work primarily focuses on
the role of fiscal policy at the zero lower bound. In this paper, I focus on how uncertainty
about the future can affect the monetary authority’s ability to stabilize the economy using
expectations about future policy.
2.5.2 Contractionary Bias in the Nominal Interest-Rate Distribution
In addition to the precautionary working mechanism, increases in uncertainty at the zero
lower bound can produce an additional source of fluctuations. This additional amplifica-
tion mechanism, which Basu and Bundick (2012) defines as the contractionary bias in the
nominal interest rate distribution, can dramatically affect the economy when uncertainty
increases at the zero lower bound. The contractionary bias emerges when the zero lower
bound prevents the monetary authority from attaining its inflation goal on average. For this
discussion, assume monetary policy sets its desired policy rate using the following simple
rule:
rdt = r + φpi
(
pit − pi
)
(2.20)
rt = max
(
0, rdt
)
(2.21)
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For a given monetary policy rule, the volatility of the exogenous shocks determines the
volatility of inflation. Through the monetary policy rule in Equation (2.20), the volatility
of inflation dictates the volatility of the desired nominal policy rate. However, since the
zero lower bound left-truncates the actual policy rate distribution, more volatile desired
policy rates lead to higher average actual policy rates. Figure 2.10 illustrates this effect by
plotting hypothetical distributions of the nominal interest rate under low and high levels of
exogenous shock volatility. The plot shows that the average actual policy rate is an increas-
ing function of the volatility of the exogenous shocks when monetary policy follows a simple
Taylor (1993)-type rule. Reifschneider and Williams (2000) first discuss this phenomenon
and Mendes (2011) analytically proves this result using a simple New-Keynesian model.
Changes in the contractionary bias caused by higher uncertainty have dramatic general-
equilbrium effects on the economy. Figure 2.11 plots the average Fisher relation r = pi+ rr
and the average policy rule under both high and low levels of volatility. The upper-right
intersection of the monetary policy rule and the Fisher relation dictates the normal general-
equilibrium average levels of inflation and the nominal interest rate. An increase in volatility
shifts the policy rule inward and increases the average nominal interest rate for a given level
of inflation. Higher volatility thus raises average real interest rates, since it implies a higher
level of the nominal interest rate for a given level of inflation. All else equal, higher real
interest rates discourages output and puts downward pressure on the average level of infla-
tion in the economy. Appendix A.2 provides numerical evidence that small changes in the
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contractionary bias caused by higher expected volatility can have dramatic effects on the
model economy. For example, Basu and Bundick (2012) shows that a small 0.25 percentage
point increase in uncertainty about future demand produces a 0.35 percent decrease in ag-
gregate output when monetary policy follows a simple Taylor (1993)-type rule at the zero
lower bound.
Throughout this paper, I follow Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and focus on specifi-
cations for monetary policy that remove this alternative mechanism. The constant price-
level target automatically removes the contractionary bias by offsetting any deflation with
equivalent inflation in the future. When monetary policy is conducted optimally under
commitment or the history-dependent interest rate rule, I add or subtract a constant bias
correction to the steady state inflation rate Π under high uncertainty to ensure the simu-
lated model delivers zero inflation on average. This modeling strategy allows me to isolate
the effects of the precautionary behavior by households and show how it makes the economy
less responsive to the expected path of interest rates. Without these corrections, an increase
in the contractionary bias caused by higher uncertainty implies that the monetary authority
misses its unconditional inflation target simply because the zero lower bound binds in a few
more states of the world.
This discussion of the contractionary bias helps clarify the economic mechanisms at work
in some recent papers in the literature. Recent work by Nakata (2012) and Johannsen (2013)
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show that higher demand and fiscal uncertainty at the zero lower bound greatly depresses
the economy. Both papers use nonlinear New-Keynesian models and assume that monetary
policy follows a Taylor (1993)-type rule subject to the zero lower bound. However, neither
of these papers make any adjustments for the contractionary bias. Therefore, their results
contain the effects of both the contractionary bias and precautionary working mechanisms.
While quantitatively large, the effects of the contractionary bias channel emerge as a tech-
nical consequence of examining changes in uncertainty under a particular simple monetary
policy rule. In addition, the uncorrected Taylor (1993)-type rule probably does not repre-
sent the actual conduct of Federal Reserve policy at the zero lower bound. Therefore, while
these papers also examine the effects of uncertainty at the zero lower bound, they primarily
rely on a very different economic mechanism to generate their results.
2.5.3 Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
Recent papers by Vavra (2012) and Aastveit, Natvik and Sola (2013) argue that mon-
etary policy is less effective at altering economic activity when uncertainty is high. As
the micro level, Vavra (2012) shows that the output response to a nominal shock in an
Ss pricing-model is substantially reduced when the volatility of firm-level productivity in-
creases. Aastveit, Natvik and Sola (2013) shows that the responses of output and investment
to an identified monetary policy shock are reduced under higher macro-level uncertainty.
Both of these papers share a common message with this paper: Higher expected volatility
can affect the transmission of monetary policy to the macroeconomy. However, these papers
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focus on the effects of higher uncertainty on different agents in the economy. Vavra (2012)
examines how uncertainty affects the forward-looking decisions of price-setting firms, while
Aastveit, Natvik and Sola (2013) follows the intuition of Bloom (2009) and emphasizes
non-convex adjustment costs for investment. In this paper, I focus on precautionary saving
and working behavior by households. I view these works as highly complementary to this
paper as all three papers illustrate the various effects of uncertainty on the effectiveness of
monetary policy. However, both of these papers are silent on the effects of the zero lower
bound, which currently remains a real constraint on many central banks.
2.6 Extensions
2.6.1 Raising the Central Bank’s Inflation Target
In response to the recent macroeconomic outcomes around the world, some economists argue
that central banks should raise their inflation targets above the conventionally accepted two
percent. Ball (2013) states, “A four percent target would ease the constraints on monetary
policy arising from the zero lower bound on interest rates, with the result that economic
downturns would be less severe.” In the previous sections, I assume that the central bank
targets a zero average inflation rate with a four percent average real interest rate. To ex-
amine the effects of a higher inflation target, I re-calibrate the steady state inflation rate
Π such that the average inflation rate is either two or four percent with a two percent real
interest rate. Figure 2.12 shows the simulation results under two or four percent inflation
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targets under optimal monetary policy where the economy faces high uncertainty about the
future.
In choosing an inflation target, the central bank faces a trade-off between the average
level of inflation and the amount of fluctuations caused by the zero lower bound. Under
the two percent inflation target, the results are similar to the previous sections since the
average nominal interest rate in the economy remains unchanged. In the face of large shocks,
Figure 2.12 shows that a higher inflation target helps attenuate much of the fluctuations
and downside risk associated with the zero lower bound. In addition, the economy exits the
zero lower bound over two years earlier in the median simulation. While the model clearly
does not properly model the costs of higher average inflation, the results are consistent with
the ideas of Ball (2013) and Blanchard, Dell‘Ariccia and Mauro (2010) that higher average
inflation can reduce fluctuations associated with the zero lower bound. The results also
supplement the work of Williams (2009) by showing that a two-percent inflation target may
provide insufficient buffer even under optimal monetary policy.
2.7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to show how uncertainty about the future can affect the ability of
the monetary authority to stabilize the economy. In the absence of the zero lower bound,
monetary policy could simply alleviate the contractionary effects of uncertainty by lowering
its nominal policy rate. When the monetary authority encounters the zero lower bound,
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the central bank must rely on expectations about the future path of policy. This paper
shows that the monetary authority must commit to a more expansive policy when the
future is more uncertain. This study emphasizes that policymakers must consider the entire
distribution of possible outcomes when evaluating trade-offs at the zero lower bound.
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Table 2.1: Calibration of Model Parameters
Parameter Description Calibrated Value
β Household Discount Factor 0.99
φP Adjustment Cost to Changing Prices 160.0
Π Steady State Inflation Rate 1.000
σ Parameter Affecting Household Risk Aversion 2.0
η Consumption Share in Period Utility Function 0.24
θ Elasticity of Substitution Intermediate Goods 6.0
ρa Preference Shock Persistence 0.85
σa Low Uncertainty Preference Shock Volatility 0.015
σa High Uncertainty Preference Shock Volatility 0.045
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Figure 2.1: Precautionary Labor Supply Intuition
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Figure 2.2: Model Responses to Zero Lower Bound Episode under Price-Level Targeting
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Figure 2.3: Model Simulations After Hitting Zero Lower Bound under Price-Level Targeting
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Figure 2.4: Expected Distributions at Zero Lower Bound under Price-Level Targeting
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Figure 2.5: Model Responses to Zero Lower Bound Episode under Optimal Policy
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Figure 2.6: Model Simulations After Hitting Zero Lower Bound under Optimal Policy
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Figure 2.7: Expected Distributions at Zero Lower Bound under Optimal Policy
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Figure 2.8: Model Simulations and Recent Macroeconomic Data
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Note: The output gap is plotted in percent deviations. The nominal interest rate and
inflation are plotted in annualized percent. See main text for data sources.
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Figure 2.9: Model Simulations and Recent Macroeconomic Data Without Zero Lower Bound
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Figure 2.10: Nominal Interest Rate Distribution with Zero Lower Bound Constraint
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Figure 2.11: Simple Monetary Policy Rules & Fisher Relation with Zero Lower Bound
Constraint
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Figure 2.12: Model Simulations Under Two and Four Percent Inflation Targets
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inflation are plotted in annualized percent. Monetary policy is conducted optimally under
commitment.
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Real Fluctuations at the Zero Lower
Bound
3.1 Introduction
Since the end of 2008, the United States economy has remained stuck at the zero lower
bound. With the federal funds rate currently near zero, the Federal Reserve cannot fur-
ther help stabilize the economy by lowering its short-term nominal policy rate. Since the
monetary authority can no longer use its standard policy tool, many economists have ar-
gued that the economy is fundamentally different at the zero lower bound. For example,
Krugman (2011) argues that improvements in technology that would normally cause output
to expand can cause economic contractions at the zero lower bound. Work by Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) and many others argue that the benefits of increased gov-
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ernment spending are much larger when the economy is in a liquidity trap. Finally, recent
work by Eggertsson, Ferrero and Raffo (2013) argues that structural reforms in Europe that
would decrease firm market power do not support economic activity in the short-run since
the European Central Bank is also near the zero lower bound.
In this paper, I argue that these results about the differential nature of the economy at the
zero lower bound crucially hinge on particular assumptions about monetary policy. Previous
work on the effects of real shocks at the zero lower bound commonly uses dynamic general
equilibrium models with nominal rigidites. In almost all studies, the previous literature
assumes that monetary policy conducts policy according to some form of the following
Taylor (1993)-type policy rule subject to the zero lower bound:
rdt = r + φpipit + φxxt (3.1)
rt = max
(
0, rdt
)
(3.2)
where rdt is the desired policy rate of the monetary authority, pit is the inflation rate, xt
is some measure of real economic activity, rt is the actual policy rate subject to the zero
lower bound, and φpi ≥ 1 and φpi ≥ 0 are parameters. During normal times, this policy
rule prescribes that the central bank responds to contemporaneous fluctuations in inflation
and economic activity using its short-term nominal policy rate. When inflation and eco-
nomic activity fall too low, however, the central bank becomes constrained by the zero lower
bound. Under this standard policy rule, government spending multipliers can be very large,
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and increases in technology and firm competitiveness can cause large declines in output at
the zero lower bound.
However, standard Taylor (1993)-type policy rules imply that the central bank stops re-
sponding to the state of the economy at the zero lower bound. The contemporaneous policy
rule implies that the monetary authority will only begin to respond to the economy once
inflation and real economic activity increase enough to allow the economy to liftoff from the
zero lower bound. Even if the economy is continually hit by bad shocks at the zero lower
bound, the central bank will not respond to the economy until conditions improve. This
assumption is inconsistent with many recent statements and actions by policymakers. For
example, the December 2011 statement from the Federal Open Market Committee states,
“The Committee will continue to assess the economic outlook in light of incoming infor-
mation and is prepared to employ its tools to promote a stronger economic recovery in a
context of price stability.” Since encountering the zero lower bound, many central banks
have relied on “unconventional” policy tools of forward guidance about the future conduct
of policy and quantitative easing to help improve macroeconomic outcomes. While the ex-
act effectiveness of these policies remains unknown, central banks continue to endogenously
respond to macroeconomic conditions.1
In this paper, I examine the effects of real shocks at the zero lower bound when the central
1See Bernanke (2012) for a review of the effectiveness of these policies.
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bank continues to respond to the state of the economy. I use a plausible deviation from a
standard policy rule that allows the central bank respond to the economy using expectations
about future policy. By adjusting the future path of policy in response to current economic
conditions, previous work by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Wolman (2005), and others
advocates that the central bank can mitigate some of the contractionary effects of the zero
lower bound. As originally discussed by Reifschneider and Williams (2000), these policies
can be easily modeled through the following history-dependent monetary policy rule:
rdt = r + φpipit + φxxt + φd
(
rdt−1 − rt−1
)
(3.3)
rt = max
(
0, rdt
)
(3.4)
where φd > 0 is a parameter. When the monetary authority is unconstrained by the zero
lower bound, the policy rule in Equation (3.3) responds exactly as a simple Taylor (1993)-
type policy rule. However, when the monetary authority encounters the zero lower bound,
the history-dependent monetary policy rule lowers future desired policy rates to offset the
previous higher-than-desired nominal rates that occurred due to the zero lower bound.
Agents in the economy internalize the future expansionary monetary policy, which helps
stabilize the economy at the zero lower bound. Thus, the central bank continues to respond
to the state of the economy at the zero lower bound by adjusting its future conduct of policy.
I show that these assumptions about future monetary policy are crucial in determining
the effects of real shocks at the zero lower bound. If monetary policy continues to respond to
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the economy, government spending multipliers can be smaller than one and improvements
in technology and firm competitiveness can increase output. Thus, the responses of the
economy to real shocks do not look as fundamentally different than an economy away from
the zero lower bound. This dependence of the model responses to the specification of policy
echoes the previous work of Basu and Kimball (2005). They show that shocks that cause
output to rise under “good” monetary policy rules generally tend to have contractionary
effects under more sub-optimal policy rules. However, this paper argues that differences in
policy specifications still matter greatly even when current policy rates are zero. The results
suggest that the model-implied benefits of policy inventions such as increased government
spending, quantitative easing, and central bank liquidity facilities all depend crucially on
the assumptions about the future conduct of monetary policy.
3.2 Model
This section outlines the baseline dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that I use
my analysis. The baseline model shares many features with the models of Ireland (2003)
and Ireland (2011). The model features optimizing households and firms and a central
bank that systematically adjusts the nominal interest rate to offset adverse shocks in the
economy. I allow for sticky prices using the quadratic-adjustment costs specification of
Rotemberg (1982). The baseline model considers fluctuations in the discount factor of
households, technology, government spending, and firms’ desired markups.
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3.2.1 Households
In the model, the representative household maximizes lifetime expected utility over streams
of consumption Ct and leisure 1−Nt. The household receives labor income Wt for each unit
of labor Nt supplied in the representative intermediate goods-producing firm. The repre-
sentative household also owns the intermediate goods firm and receives lump-sum dividends
Dt. The household also has access to zero net supply nominal bonds Bt and real bonds BRt .
A nominal bond pays the gross one-period nominal interest rate Rt while a real bond pays
the gross one-period real interest rate RRt . The household divides its income from labor
and its financial assets between consumption Ct and the amount of the bonds Bt+1 and
BRt+1 to carry into next period. The government levies lump-sum taxes Tt on households
each period. The discount factor of the household β is subject to shocks via the stochastic
process at. An increase in at induces households to consume more and work less for no
technological reason. Thus, I interpret changes in the household discount factor as demand
shocks for the economy.
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility by choosing Ct+s, Nt+s, Bt+s+1,
and BRt+s+1, for all s = 0, 1, 2, . . . by solving the following problem:
max Et
∞∑
s=0
at+sβ
s
(
log (Ct+s)− χ
N1+ηt+s
1 + η
)
subject to the intertemporal household budget constraint each period,
Ct +
1
Rt
Bt+1
Pt
+
1
RRt
BRt+1 ≤
Wt
Pt
Nt +
Bt
Pt
+
Dt
Pt
+BRt − Tt.
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Using a Lagrangian approach, household optimization implies the following first-order con-
ditions:
atC
−1
t = λt (3.5)
Nηt = λt
Wt
Pt
(3.6)
1 = Et
{(
β
λt+1
λt
)(
RtPt
Pt+1
)}
(3.7)
1 = Et
{(
β
λt+1
λt
)
RRt
}
(3.8)
where λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the household budget constraint. Equations
(3.5) - (3.6) represent the household intratemporal optimality conditions with respect to
consumption and leisure, and Equations (3.7) - (3.8) represent the Euler equations for the
one-period nominal and real bonds.
3.2.2 Final Goods Producers
The representative final goods producer uses Yt(i) units of each intermediate good produced
by the intermediate goods-producing firm i ∈ [0, 1]. The intermediate output is transformed
into final output Yt using the following constant returns to scale technology:
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
θt−1
θt di
] θt
θt−1 ≥ Yt
θt is the elasticity of substitution across different intermediate goods, which is subject to
exogenous fluctuations. Each intermediate good Yt(i) sells at nominal price Pt(i) and each
final good sells at nominal price Pt. The finished goods producer chooses Yt and Yt(i) for
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all i ∈ [0, 1] to maximize the following expression of firm profits:
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di
subject to the constant returns to scale production function. Finished goods-producer
optimization results in the following first-order condition:
Yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θt
Yt
The market for final goods is perfectly competitive, and thus the final goods-producing firm
earns zero profits in equilibrium. Using the zero-profit condition, the first-order condition
for profit maximization, and the firm objective function, the aggregate price index Pt can
be written as follows:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−θtdi
] 1
1−θt
3.2.3 Intermediate Goods Producers
Each intermediate goods-producing firm i rents labor Nt(i) from the representative house-
hold in order to produce intermediate good Yt(i). Intermediate goods are produced in
a monopolistically competitive market where producers face a quadratic cost of changing
their nominal price Pt(i) each period. Firm i chooses Nt(i), and Pt(i) to maximize the dis-
counted present-value of cash flows Dt(i)/Pt(i) given aggregate demand Yt and price Pt of
the finished goods sector. The intermediate goods firms all have access to the same constant
returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function, subject to a fixed cost of production Φ.
Changes in θt cause fluctuations in the desired markups of intermediate-goods producing
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firms over marginal cost.
Each intermediate goods-producing firm maximizes discount cash flows using the house-
hold stochastic discount factor:
max Et
∞∑
s=0
(
βs
λt+s
λt
)[
Dt+s(i)
Pt+s
]
subject to the production function:[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θt
Yt ≤ ZtNt(i)− Φ,
where
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−θt
Yt − Wt
Pt
Nt(i)− φP2
[
Pt(i)
ΠPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
Yt
The first-order conditions for the firm i are as follows:
Wt
Pt
Nt(i) = ΞtZtNt(i) (3.9)
φP
[
Pt(i)
ΠPt−1(i)
− 1
] [
Pt
ΠPt−1(i)
]
= (1− θt)
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θt
+ θtΞt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θt−1
+φPEt
{(
β
λt+1
λt
)
Yt+1
Yt
[
Pt+1(i)
ΠPt(i)
− 1
] [
Pt+1(i)
ΠPt(i)
Pt
Pt(i)
]}
,
(3.10)
where Zt is the level of technology and Ξt is the multiplier on the production function,
which denotes the real marginal cost of producing an additional unit of intermediate good
i.
3.2.4 Monetary and Fiscal Policy
I assume a cashless economy where the monetary authority sets the one-period net nominal
interest rate rt = log(Rt). Due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, the central
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bank cannot lower its nominal policy rate below by zero. I assume that monetary policy
follows one of following specifications, which are both subject to the zero lower bound:
rdt = r + φpilog
(
Πt/Π
)
+ φylog
(
Yt/Y
)
(3.11)
rdt = r + φpilog
(
Πt/Π
)
+ φylog
(
Yt/Y
)
+ φd
(
rdt−1 − rt−1
)
(3.12)
rt = max
(
0, rdt
)
. (3.13)
Equation (3.11) is a standard Taylor (1993)-type policy rule, where the central bank re-
sponds only to contemporaneous deviations from output and inflation from their steady
state values. However, when the economy encounters the zero lower bound, the central
bank is unable to respond to the economy. Equation (3.12) endogenously adjusts the fu-
ture path of monetary policy when the economy encounters the zero lower bound. The
additional parameter φd controls the amount of response of the future path of policy when
the economy hits the zero lower bound. When the economy is unconstrained by the zero
lower bound, the two previous rules will imply the same monetary policy rule. Fiscal policy
finances government spending Gt using lump-sum taxes on households.
3.2.5 Shock Processes
The model features fluctuations in household discount factors, technology, the desired
markup of firms, and government spending. The stochastic process for these fluctuations is
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as follows:
at = (1− ρa)a+ ρaat−1 + σaεat (3.14)
Zt = (1− ρZ)Z + ρZZt−1 + σZεZt (3.15)
θt = (1− ρθ)θ + ρθθt−1 + σθεθt (3.16)
Gt = (1− ρG)G+ ρGGt−1 + σGεGt (3.17)
The steady state levels of the discount factor and technology shock are normalized to one.
In this paper, I am interested in comparing the responses of the model economy both at
and away from the zero lower bound. To simulate a large recession that takes the economy
to the zero lower bound, I simulate a large increase in the household discount factor. This
shock acts like a large decline in aggregate demand, which forces the economy to encounter
the zero lower bound. After encountering the zero lower bound, I examine the impact of
the three other real shocks conditional on either specification of monetary policy.
3.2.6 Equilibrium and Solution Method
In the symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate goods firms choose the same price Pt(i) = Pt
and employ the same amount of labor Nt(i) = Nt. Thus, all firms have the same cash
flows and I define gross inflation as Πt = Pt/Pt−1 and the markup over marginal cost as
µt = 1/Ξt. Therefore, I can model the intermediate-goods firms with a single representative
intermediate goods-producing firm.
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To formally analyze the impact of the zero lower bound, I solve the model using the
policy function iteration method of Coleman (1990) and Davig (2004). This global approx-
imation method, as opposed to local perturbation methods such as linearization, allows me
to model the occasionally binding zero lower bound constraint. This method discretizes
the state variables on a grid and solves for the policy functions which satisfy all the model
equations at each point in the state space. Appendix C.1 contains the details of the policy
function iteration algorithm. In the following sections, I use a first-order linearized version
of the model to convey the main intuition of my results. In the quantitative numerical
exercises, however, I use the full non-linear model outlined in Section 3.2. Recent work by
Braun, Ko¨rber and Waki (2012) shows that the linearized model can produce qualitatively
government spending multipliers at the zero lower bound. Therefore, I use the linearized
model to build intuition, but use the nonlinear model to assure an accurate solution at the
zero lower bound.
3.2.7 Calibration
Table 3.1 lists the calibrated parameters of the model. I calibrate the model at quarterly
frequency using standard parameters for one-sector models of fluctuations. Since the model
shares features with the estimated models of Ireland (2003) and Ireland (2011), I calibrate
many of the parameters to match the estimates reported by those papers. I choose χ to
normalize output Y to equal one at the deterministic steady state. I calibrate η such that
the model has a Frisch labor supply elasticity of one half. The fixed cost of production for
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the intermediate-goods firm Φ is calibrated to (µ− 1)Y, which eliminates pure profits in
the deterministic steady state of the model.
The crucial parameter in my calibration is the policy parameter φd, which controls amount
of history-dependence in the policy rule. In my baseline model, I calibrate set φd = 0.9,
which implies a fair amount of history-dependence when the economy hits the zero lower
bound. In addition to the anecdotal evidence from the Introduction, work by Gust, Lo´pez-
Salido and Smith (2013) suggests that the Federal Reserve’s recent behavior can be described
by an interest-rate rule with significant history-dependence. In the following simulations, I
compare the effects of real shocks under a standard Taylor (1993)-type rule to the history-
dependent policy rule. When the economy is away from the zero lower bound, these rules
imply the exact same behavior of the monetary authority.
3.3 Effects of Real Shocks
3.3.1 Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply
Before turning to my quantitative findings, I present the key intuition for my results heuristi-
cally using simple aggregate demand and aggregate supply diagrams as in ?. These relations
can be derived using a first-order approximation around the deterministic steady state. Fig-
ure 3.1 plots the aggregate demand and supply curves for the economy both at and away
from the zero lower bound. The key difference at the zero lower bound is that the aggregate
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demand curve becomes upward sloping in output and inflation space. This result emerges
from the interactions of the Fisher relation r = pi + rr and the zero lower bound. During
normal times, the central bank follows the Taylor principle and adjusts its nominal interest
rate r more than one for one with movements in inflation. If inflation rises by one percent,
nominal interest rates rise by more than one percent through the Taylor principle. Thus,
real interest rates rr real interest rates rise after an increase in inflation. Higher real interest
rates discourage consumption, which causes a decline in output. The endogenous response
of the monetary authority to movements in inflation is the key component in generating the
downward sloping aggregate demand curve.
At the zero lower bound, however, the slope of the aggregate demand curve becomes
positive. Higher inflation cannot be immediately offset by higher nominal policy rates to-
day. An increase in inflation lowers real interest rates, which induces higher consumption
and output and the positive slope of the aggregate demand curve. This differential slope
of the aggregate demand curve is why the previous work argues that the economy is fun-
damentally different at the zero lower bound. For example, Figure 3.2 analyzes a shock
which causes a downward shift in the aggregate supply curve holding the aggregate de-
mand curve fixed. During normal times, this shock would normally cause a modest decline
in inflation and an increase in output. All else equal, the same shock at the zero lower
bound would imply a larger disinflation and a fall in economic activity. Thus, the inability
of the monetary authority to adjust its current nominal policy rate generates the upward
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sloping demand curve and the potential for changing the response of the economy to shocks.
The point of this paper is to highlight that the central bank can still have a stabilizing
role even in the face of the upward sloping demand curve. Although it cannot adjust its
current policy rate, the central bank can endogenously adjust its future path of policy in
order to offset adverse fluctuations. By committing to a lower path of nominal policy rates
for any given level of expected inflation, the central bank can affect expectations of future
inflation and output at the zero lower bound. Although the central bank cannot affect
the slope of the aggregate demand curve in Figure 3.2, it can still affect the equilibrium
outcomes of inflation and output through shift variables of expected inflation and output.
Expectations of higher inflation in the future cause an additional upward shift in the ag-
gregate supply curve as firms choose higher prices for any given level of current output and
inflation. Higher inflation and output in the future cause the aggregate demand curve to
shift outward by lowering real interest rates and inducing higher consumption.
The simple demand and supply diagrams show that the equilibrium outcomes for inflation
and output clearly depend on the magnitude of the shifts. The amount of endogenous
response of the monetary authority at the zero lower bound is controlled by the amount
of history-dependence in the policy rule. In the next section, I show that a reasonably
calibrated model with a fair amount of history dependence is enough to dramatically alter
the responses of several real shocks. Thus, the differential nature of the economy at the
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zero lower bound depends crucially on the assumptions about future policy.
3.3.2 Technology Shocks
Figure 3.3 plots the impulse response of a one percent increase in technology both at and
away from the zero lower bound. Figure 3.4 shows the impact of the shock heuristically
using the aggregate supply and demand diagrams from the previous section. Away from the
zero lower bound, the increase in productivity decreases firm marginal costs. Lower current
and future marginal costs cause a shift down in the aggregate supply curve as firms choose
lower prices for any given level of current output. Under a standard Taylor (1993)-rule, the
central bank aggressively lowers its nominal policy rate. By following the Taylor principle,
the central bank lowers its policy rate more than one for one with inflation, which helps
lower real interest rates. Since the technology shock is persistent, agents expect higher
output throughout the duration of the shock. Higher output expectations shift out the
aggregate demand curve for any given level of real interest rates. However, the central bank
does not response aggressively enough and the economy experiences some disinflation as a
result of the technological improvement. At impact of the shock, output rises by one half
percent and inflation falls by three-quarters of one percent when the central bank follows a
standard policy rule away from the zero lower bound.
Under a standard Taylor (1993) rule at the zero lower bound, the technology shock be-
comes highly contractionary. Under a positively slope aggregate demand curve, a shift
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downward in the aggregate supply curve reduces output and generates a large disinflation.
Expectations of lower output in the future also cause a leftward shift in the aggregate de-
mand curve, as households reduce consumption for a given level of real interest rates. At
impact, inflation and output fall by one percent and remain negative throughout the zero
lower bound episode. Under its contemporaneous policy rule, the monetary authority be-
gins responding to the economy only after the zero lower bound episode and doesn’t alter
its future course of policy after the large contractionary shock.
If monetary policy follows the history-dependent rule, then the central bank responds to
the technology shock using forward guidance about future policy. In response to the large
contractions in output and inflation, the central bank commits to a lower path of policy
in the future. Expectations of future expansionary policy raises inflation expectations and
causes an upward shift in the aggregate supply curve. Higher expected output after the zero
lower bound episode helps attenuate much of the leftward shift in the aggregate demand
curve. For the calibrated model from Section 3.2, the additional shifts implied by the
history-dependent rule are enough to offset much of the contraction in output. After a
smaller initial contraction of one half percent, output rises and remains positive throughout
the duration of the zero lower bound episode. The time path for inflation starts below and
then rises above the the impulse responses away from the zero lower bound. Overall, the
results indicate that the equilibrium response of a technology shock depends crucially on
future assumptions about monetary policy. If the monetary authority uses forward guidance
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to stabilize the economy, the response to a technology shock may not look too qualitatively
different at the zero lower bound.
3.3.3 Markup Shocks
Figure 3.5 plots the impulse response of a one percent decrease in firm desired markups
both at and away from the zero lower bound. This shock is also acts as a positive supply
shock which causes a downward shift in the aggregate supply curve. Thus, Figure 3.6 shows
the results through the shifts in aggregate supply and demand, which looks qualitatively
similar to the technology shock responses. Recent work by Eggertsson, Ferrero and Raffo
(2013) argues that a decrease in desired markups can model the proposed structural reforms
in Europe designed to increase overall competitiveness. The calibrated model implies that
a one percent decrease in desired markups causes a 0.2 percent increase in output and 0.4
percent decline in inflation at impact away from the zero lower bound. If the central bank
fails to respond to the economy at the zero lower bound, the same shock causes declines in
output and inflation of over one percent. However, if the central bank tries to stabilize the
economy using expectations of future policy, the time path for inflation looks similar to the
responses away from the zero lower bound. After an initial small decline, output remains
positive throughout the zero lower bound episode. Thus, the equilibrium responses to a
markup shock may not be fundamentally different if the central bank continues to respond
to the state of the economy.
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3.3.4 Government Spending Shocks
Finally, I examine the effects of increased government spending. Recent work by Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) and many others argues that government spending multi-
pliers are substantially larger when the economy is constrained by the zero lower bound.
Figure 3.8 plots the impulse responses of the model to a one percent increase in govern-
ment spending and Figure 3.9 illustrates the results in aggregate supply and demand space.
Higher government spending induces a negative wealth effect on households, which causes
them to work more for any given level of the real wage. Higher labor input, with the in-
creased government spending, creates expectations of higher output in the future. Higher
expected output shifts out the aggregate demand curve. However, the household’s desire
to work more increases firm marginal costs. Higher future marginal costs raise inflation
expectations and shifts out the aggregate supply curve as well. When the economy is away
from the zero lower bound, the negative wealth effect on households causes them to reduce
overall consumption. Since the model does not have capital, Yt = Ct + Gt, so a fall in
consumption implies a government spending multiplier of less than one.
Under the standard Taylor (1993) rule at the zero lower bound, the outward shift in ag-
gregate demand raises both inflation and output. The increased inflation expectations help
further lower real interest rates. These lower real interest rates induce higher consumption
and cause consumption to increase after the shock. Thus, the government spending multi-
plier becomes larger than one when the central bank follows a standard contemporaneous
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policy rule. While the exact size of the multiplier is subject to specific conditions, the up-
ward sloping aggregate demand curve and the non-responsive monetary policy are crucial
elements in getting consumption to rise after a spending shock.
Under the history-dependent policy, the central bank endogenously adjusts its future path
in an effort the curb future inflation. Thus, the monetary policy rule implies a tighter policy
in the future because of the large increase in government spending. Expectations of higher
nominal rates in the future induce lower output and inflation expectations. Expectations of
lower output and inflation shift the aggregate demand curve backward and induce a slight
downward shift in the aggregate supply curve. By continuing to respond to the economy,
the central bank curtails much of the expansion caused by fiscal policy in order to maintain
stabile inflation. Consumption now falls under the history-dependent policy, which reduces
the spending multiplier to less than one. The results highlight that the model-implied
benefits of higher government spending, even when current nominal interest rates are zero,
depend crucially on the assumptions about monetary policy.
3.3.5 Amount of History-Dependence
The previous result highlight that history-dependence in the monetary policy rule can sig-
nificantly alter the effects of real shocks. In my baseline model, I calibrate the history-
dependence parameter φd to be 0.9. This value is consistent with the empirical evidence of
Gust, Lo´pez-Salido and Smith (2013), which I discuss in the next section. In this section,
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I show the degree of history-dependence in the policy rule needed to alter the effects of
shocks at the zero lower bound. Figure 3.9 plots the model responses of a positive tech-
nology shock at the zero lower bound under alternative level of the history-dependence
parameter φd. The results show that the policy rule needs a history-dependence coefficient
of larger than 0.8 in order to eliminate much of the contractionary nature of the technology
shock at the zero lower bound. The reason for this result is largely mechanical: The degree
of history-dependence controls the length of the memory for the policy rule. Suppose that
the economy has been stuck at the zero lower bound for n periods. Then, solving backward
using the history-dependent rule implies the following value for the desired nominal policy
rate at the zero lower bound:
rdt = r + φpipit + φxxt + φdr
d
t−1
rdt = r + φpipit + φxxt + φd
(
r + φpipit−1 + φxxt−1 + φdrdt−2
)
rdt = r + φpipit + φxxt +
n∑
i=1
φid
(
r + φpipit−i + φxxt−i
)
Thus, the value of φd controls the weight of current versus past economic conditions in
the monetary policy rule. Alternatively, φd controls how the monetary authority alters the
future path of policy when they become constrained by the zero lower bound. Without
sufficiently high values for the history-dependence parameter, the amount of memory in
the policy rule decays very quickly. Also, the backward solution shows that the product
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of φid and the policy rule coefficients φpi and φx determines the overall degree of history-
dependence. Policy rules that are closer to optimal policy (Higher values of φpi and φx)
during normal times require less history-dependence in order to achieve a given level of
memory in the policy rule.
3.3.6 Forms of History-Dependence
The previous result highlight that history-dependence in the monetary policy rule can signif-
icantly alter the effects of real shocks. In my baseline model, I model this history-dependence
as the Reifschneider and Williams (2000) rule. This policy rule acts as a standard contem-
poraneous policy rule, but adds an additional term rdt−1−rt−1 that only affects the economy
during and after a zero lower bound episode. The advantage of this rule is that it nests the
standard policy rule, and thus produces the same responses away from the zero lower bound.
However, the form of the history-dependence can take many alternative forms. For example,
Gust, Lo´pez-Salido and Smith (2013) suggests that the Federal Reserve’s recent behavior
is described by a the following interest-rate rule with significant history-dependence:
rdt = (1− φr) r + φrrdt−1 + φpipit + φxxt (3.18)
rt = max
(
0, rdt
)
. (3.19)
This policy rule implies history-dependence by smoothing through the desired nominal pol-
icy rate of the central bank. At the zero lower bound, the policy rule is operationally similar
to the Reifschneider and Williams (2000) rule in my baseline model. However, the smooth-
ing in the desired policy rate will imply a more moderately sloped exit from the zero lower
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bound.
In addition to smoothing in the desired nominal policy rate, the history-dependence
policy could also target nominal income, the nominal price-level, or any other backward-
looking non-jump variable. Even small weights on these backward-looking variables in the
policy rule would imply significant history-dependence. For example, suppose the central
bank places weight on the nominal price level in its policy rule, which Gorodnichenko and
Shapiro (2007) is consistent with the Federal Reserve behavior in the late 1990s. Agents in
the economy understand that any deflation caused by the zero lower bound will eventually
be offset with higher inflation in the future to stabilize the price level. Thus, the central
bank continues to adjust its future path of policy in response to current economic conditions
at the zero lower bound. Regardless of the form of the history-dependence, the key insight
is that the central bank continues to respond to the economy at the zero lower bound. In
the next section, I explore the implications of a specific-type of history-depence, which is of
particular interest to policymakers.
3.3.7 Unemployment and History-Dependence
The previous section shows that the history-dependence in the policy rule can take a number
of forms. In this section, I show that a response of monetary policy to unemployment
automatically implies history-dependence in a model of labor search frictions. Recent work
by Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010) embeds a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching
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model of unemployment into a standard model of nominal price rigidity. In their framework,
the number of employed workers Nt evolves according to the following law of motion:
Nt = (1− ψ)Nt−1 +mt (3.20)
where mt denotes a matching function that depends on the amount of unemployed workers
and the number of vacancies, and ψ denotes the job destruction rate. Under the assumption
of full participation, the unemployment rate ut can be written as follows:
ut = 1−Nt (3.21)
Solving backward, we can write the unemployment rate as a backward looking state variable
with ψ > 0
ut = 1−
∞∑
i=0
(1− ψ)imt−i (3.22)
If monetary policy reacts to fluctuations in unemployment in its policy rule, the backward-
looking nature of the unemployment rate automatically implies history-dependence in the
monetary policy rule. At the zero lower bound, agents internalize the central bank’s com-
mitment to stabilizing the labor market. This link between current and past labor market
conditions implies that the central bank continues to respond to the state of the economy
even when constrained by the zero lower bound. This response to unemployment is con-
sistent with recent Federal Open Market Committee statements and actions. Since the
beginning of the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve consistently cites the elevated unem-
ployment rate as justification for using its policy tools to improve labor market conditions.
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3.3.8 Discussion and Connections with Existing Literature
This paper aims to extend results from the literature on monetary policy in models of
nominal price rigidities. Prior work such as Basu and Kimball (2005), Woodford (2003),
and many others shows that the effects of real shocks crucially depend on the assumptions
about monetary policy. This paper argues that the assumptions about monetary policy con-
tinue to matter greatly even the economy is stuck at the zero lower bound. Zero nominal
policy rates alone are not a sufficient definition to pin down the conduct of monetary policy.
This work is related to independent work by Erceg and Linde´ (2012), which also examines
the effects of government spending multipliers at the zero lower bound. Under a standard
Taylor (1993)-type policy rule, Erceg and Linde show that the government spending mul-
tiplier can be very large under a variety of assumptions about the structure of fiscal policy
and the frictions and agents in the real economy. In an Appendix, however, they show nu-
merically that government spending multipliers are considerably smaller at the zero lower
bound if monetary policy responds to the nominal price-level. The point of my paper is to
highlight why government spending multipliers differ greatly under the history-dependent
policy. By continuing to respond to the state of the economy at the zero lower bound,
the monetary authority endogenously adjusts future policy in response to current economic
conditions. This response offsets much of the inflation generated by the fiscal expansion
and limits the “free lunch” for the fiscal authority. In addition, I aim to highlight the in-
consistency of the standard contemporaneous policy rule assumption and the recent actions
127
Chapter 3 Real Fluctuations at the Zero Lower Bound
and statements by policymakers.
This paper is also related to work by Eggertsson and Woodford (2004). Under optimal
monetary and fiscal policy, they show that the gains from optimal monetary policy are
smaller when fiscal policy is conducted optimally in a liquidity trap. This paper aims to
show the converse of this result in a positive rather than normative setting. The benefits
from fiscal expansions in a liquidity trap are smaller if monetary policy acts in a history-
dependent manner.
3.4 Conclusions
Even when current nominal policy rates are zero, this paper argues that assumptions about
monetary policy are crucial in determining the equilibrium effects of real shocks. Alternative
assumptions about policy can generate government spending multipliers that are greater
or less than one and cause increases in technology and firm competitiveness to become
expansionary or highly contractionary. Given the importance of the assumed policy rule,
future versions of this work will aim to identify the amount of history-dependence in the
recent Federal Reserve actions. I plan to use both direct and indirect methods to argue that
this recent behavior is characterized by at least a moderate amount of history-dependence.
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Table 3.1: Calibration of Model Parameters
Parameter Description Calibrated Value
β Household Discount Factor 0.99
φP Adjustment Cost to Changing Prices 160.0
Π Steady State Inflation Rate 1.000
η Inverse of the Frisch Labor Supply Elasticity 2.0
χ Scalar Affecting Steady State Hours 0.72
θ Steady State Elasticity of Substitution Intermediate Goods 6.0
G/Y Steady State Government Spending Over Output 0.2
ρa Preference Shock Persistence 0.90
ρZ Technology Shock Persistence 0.90
ρG Government Spending Shock Persistence 0.90
ρθ Markup Shock Persistence 0.90
σa Preference Shock Volatility 0.005
σA Government Spending Shock Volatility 0.0025
σG Government Spending Shock Volatility 0.0025
σθ Markup Shock Volatility 0.0025
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Figure 3.1: Aggregate Supply and Demand and the Zero Lower Bound
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Figure 3.2: Downward Shift in Aggregate Supply
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Figure 3.3: Model Responses to Positive Technology Shock
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Note: Output, consumption, and technology are plotted as percent deviations. The nominal
interest rate is plotted in annualized percent, while the real interest rate and inflation are
plotted in annualized percent deviations.
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Figure 3.4: Effects of Positive Technology Shock
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Figure 3.5: Model Responses to Decrease in Firm Desired Markups
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Note: Output, consumption, and desired markups are plotted as percent deviations. The
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inflation are plotted in annualized percent deviations.
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Figure 3.6: Effects of Decrease in Firm Desired Markups
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Figure 3.7: Model Responses to Increase in Government Spending
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The nominal interest rate is plotted in annualized percent, while the real interest rate and
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Figure 3.8: Effects of Increase in Government Spending
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Figure 3.9: Model Responses Under Alternative Calibrations of History-Dependence
4 8 12 16 20
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Output
P e
r c
e n
t
4 8 12 16 20
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Consumption
P e
r c
e n
t
4 8 12 16 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Nominal Interest Rate
P e
r c
e n
t
4 8 12 16 20
−1.6
−1.4
−1.2
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
Inflation
P e
r c
e n
t
4 8 12 16 20
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Real Interest Rate
P e
r c
e n
t
4 8 12 16 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Technology
P e
r c
e n
t
 
 
φd = 1.0
φd = 0.75
φd = 0.5
Note: Output, consumption, and government spending are plotted as percent deviations.
The nominal interest rate is plotted in annualized percent, while the real interest rate and
inflation are plotted in annualized percent deviations.
138
Appendix A
Uncertainty Shocks in a Model of
Effective Demand
A.1 Solving the Model with a Zero Lower Bound Constraint
A.1.1 Numerical Solution Method
To analyze the impact of uncertainty shocks at the zero lower bound, we solve our model
using the policy function iteration method of Coleman (1990). This global approximation
method allows us to model the occasionally binding zero lower bound constraint. This
section provides the details of the algorithm when monetary policy follows a simple Taylor
(1993)-type interest-rate rule. The algorithm is implemented using the following steps:
1. Discretize the state variables of the model: {Kt × at × σat }
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2. Conjecture initial guesses for the policy functions of the model Nt = N(Kt, at, σat ),
It = I(Kt, at, σat ), Πt = Π(Kt, at, σ
a
t ), and EtV 1−σt+1 = EV (Kt, at, σat ).
3. For each point in the discretized state space, substitute the current policy functions
into the equilibrium conditions of the model. Use interpolation and numerical in-
tegration over the exogenous state variables at and σat to compute expectations for
each Euler equation. This operation generates a nonlinear system of equations. The
solution to this system of equations provides an updated value for the policy functions
at that point in the state space.
4. Repeat Step (3) for each point in the state space until the policy functions converge
and cease to be updated.
We implement the policy function iteration method in FORTRAN using the nonlinear equation
solver DNEQNF from the IMSL numerical library. When monetary policy follows the history-
dependent policy rule in Equation (1.28), we include the lagged difference between the
actual and desired policy rates (rt−1 − rdt−1) in the discretized state space.
A.2 Uncertainty, the Zero Lower Bound, and the
Contractionary Bias
As we discuss in the main text, the interaction between uncertainty and the zero lower
bound can produce an additional source of fluctuations beyond the precautionary working
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and saving channel. We refer to this additional amplification mechanism as the contrac-
tionary bias in the nominal interest rate distribution. In this Appendix, we show that the
contractionary bias can dramatically affect the economy when uncertainty increases at the
zero lower bound. In addition, we show that the assumptions regarding this new mecha-
nism are crucial in assessing the general-equilbrium effects of changes in uncertainty at the
zero lower bound. For Sections A.2.1-A.2.3 only, we reduce the unconditional volatility of
demand shocks σa to 0.5 percent from our baseline calibration of 2.0 percent and decrease
the standard deviation of uncertainty shocks σσ
a
to 0.50. In Section A.2.4, we explain
the rationale for temporarily reducing the volatility of the exogenous shocks hitting the
economy.
A.2.1 Impulse Response Analysis Under Simple Taylor (1993) Rule
We begin our analysis by assuming the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate
according to the following simple rule:
rdt = r + ρpi(pit − pi) (A.1)
rt = max (0, rdt ), (A.2)
where rdt is the desired policy rate of the monetary authority, and rt is the actual policy rate
subject to the zero lower bound. Figure A.1 plots the impulse responses of a one standard
deviation uncertainty shock at the ergodic mean of the model variables. These impulse
responses replicate our previous experiments using this simplified model and alternative
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calibration. Due to the considerably smaller calibration of the exogenous shocks, this al-
ternative calibration produces an extremely small drop in output: Holding the level of the
discount factor shock constant, a 50 percent increase in the volatility of the shock process
decreases output by less than one basis point. Figure A.1 also plots the impulse responses of
a one standard deviation uncertainty shock under a zero lower bound scenario similar to the
simulation in Section 1.7.3. At the zero lower bound, a one standard deviation uncertainty
shock produces a 0.35 percent drop in output. Compared to the impulse responses at the
ergodic mean, the decline in output due is magnified by over an order of magnitude when
the monetary authority is unable to change its nominal policy rate. This result explains
our claim in the text that we could explain all of the output drop in the Great Recession
as being due to uncertainty alone if we did not remove the contractionary bias.
A.2.2 Contractionary Bias in the Average Nominal Interest Rate
The previous results suggest that the zero lower bound massively amplifies uncertainty
shocks. However, our assumed monetary policy rule may be overstating the effects of the
zero lower bound. In the model, the volatility of the exogenous shocks determines the
volatility of inflation. Through the monetary policy rule in Equation (A.1), the volatility of
inflation dictates the volatility of the desired nominal policy rate. However, since the zero
lower bound left-truncates the actual policy rate distribution, more volatile desired policy
rates lead to higher average actual policy rates. Figure A.2 illustrates this effect by plotting
the distribution of the nominal interest rate under both low and high levels of exogenous
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shock volatility. Figure A.2 shows that the average actual policy rate is an increasing func-
tion of the volatility of the exogenous shocks when monetary policy follows a simple Taylor
(1993)-type rule.1 We refer to this link between the volatility of the exogenous shocks and
the level of the nominal interest rate as the contractionary bias in the actual policy rate
distribution.2
We argue that accounting for the contractionary bias is crucial in assessing the general-
equilbrium effects of changes in uncertainty at the zero lower bound. Figure A.3 plots the
average Fisher relation ln(R) = ln(Π)+ ln(RR) and the average policy rule under both high
and low levels of volatility. The upper-right intersection of the monetary policy rule and the
Fisher relation dictates the normal general-equilibrium average levels of inflation and the
nominal interest rate. An increase in volatility shifts the policy rule inward and increases
the average nominal interest rate for a given level of inflation. Higher volatility thus raises
average real interest rates, since it implies a higher level of the nominal interest rate for
a given level of inflation. All else equal, higher real interest rates discourage consumption
1Using a simple New-Keynesian model without capital, Mendes (2011) analytically proves that the average
nominal interest rate is increasing in the volatility of the exogenous shocks when monetary policy follows
a simple Taylor (1993)-type rule.
2Nakata (2013) and Nakov (2008) also use a New-Keynesian model to examine the zero lower bound in a
dynamic and stochastic setting. Both papers also discuss this link between the volatility of the exogenous
shocks and the average level of the nominal interest rate under a simple policy rule or optimal monetary
policy under discretion.
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and investment and depress output in the economy.
Using this intuition regarding the contractionary bias, we can identify two distinct sources
of fluctuations in the impulse responses in Figure A.1. An increase in uncertainty induces
precautionary saving and working, which we discuss in detail in the main text of the paper.
In addition, the uncertainty shock temporarily increases the contractionary bias in the
expected average nominal interest rate. The transitory increase in the contractionary bias
implies higher expected nominal interest rates for any given level of inflation. Even though
current nominal rates remain at the zero lower bound, an increase in expected nominal
rates after the zero lower bound episode raises expected real interest rates. Higher future
real interest rates reduce expected future output and inflation, which lowers current output
and inflation through forward-looking consumption and investment decisions. Like the
precautionary saving and working channel, the transitory increase in the contractionary
bias produces declines in output and its components. Our previous impulse responses in
Figure A.1 show the effects of both mechanisms. However, the previous results obscure the
relative contribution of each mechanism in explaining the amplification of the uncertainty
shock.
A.2.3 Impulse Response Analysis Under History-Dependent Policy Rule
To quantify the contribution of each mechanism, we also examine the impact of an uncer-
tainty shock at the zero lower bound under the history-dependent policy rule in Equation
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(1.28). As we discuss in the main text, this alternative specification for monetary policy
removes the contractionary bias by promising to offset deviations from the desired policy
rule caused by the zero lower bound. Figure A.1 also plots the impulse responses to an
uncertainty shock for the history-dependent policy rule under the alternative shock calibra-
tion. A demand uncertainty shock at the zero lower bound produces a two basis point drop
in output when the monetary authority follows the history-dependent policy rule. The dif-
ferences in the impulse responses under each monetary policy rule allows us to quantify the
relative contributions of the contractionary bias and the precautionary saving and working
channels. Under the simple Taylor (1993) rule, Figure A.1 shows that the increase in the
contractionary bias and the precautionary behavior channel combine to produce a decline
in output of 35 basis points. This decline is much larger than the 2 basis point decline
under the history-dependent policy rule, which only features the precautionary saving and
working channel. These results suggest that the increase in the contractionary bias explains
much of the decline in output after an uncertainty shock when monetary follows a simple
interest-rate rule.
A.2.4 Uncertainty, Contractionary Bias, and Equilibrium Existence
In addition to greatly amplifying fluctuations due to changes in uncertainty, this section
provides evidence that the contractionary bias can even interfere with equilibrium existence
under some calibrations. When the monetary authority follows the simple policy rule in
Equation (A.1), Figure A.3 shows an increase in volatility shifts the policy rule to the left
145
Appendix A Uncertainty Shocks in a Model of Effective Demand
and increases the average nominal interest. For high levels of volatility, however, the policy
rule shifts far enough to the left such that the policy rule no longer intersects the Fisher
relation. In this situation, Mendes (2011) shows that a rational expectations equilibrium
fails to exist because the contractionary bias is too large. Mendes (2011) also conjectures
that a simple history-dependent rule like Equation (1.28) should remove the contractionary
bias since the average nominal interest rate is no longer increasing in the volatility of the
exogenous shocks.
Our computational experiments provide numerical support to the analytical results and
conjectures of Mendes (2011). When monetary policy follows the simple Taylor (1993) rule
in Equation (A.1), we are unable to solve our model numerically for our baseline calibration
of σa = 0.02 and σσ
a
= 0.019. This numerical failure suggests that the contractionary bias
is large enough that a rational expectations equilibrium fails to exist for this calibration.3
However, we are able to solve our model when we decrease the size of the exogenous shocks
to σa = 0.005 and σσ
a
= 0.0025. This result suggests that the smaller exogenous shock
volatility decreases the size of the contractionary bias to a level consistent with a rational
expectations equilibrium. However, when monetary policy follows the history-dependent
rule in Equation (A.1), we are able to solve our model using our baseline calibration of
3The contractionary bias only affects equilibrium existence when the monetary authority follows a simple
Taylor (1993)-type rule subject to the zero lower bound. Without the zero lower bound, an increase in
volatility increases the volatility of the nominal interest rate, but leaves the average level of the nominal
interest rate unchanged.
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σa = 0.02 and σσ
a
= 0.019. This numerical result suggests that the conjecture by Mendes
(2011) is correct and the history-dependent rule removes the contractionary bias in the
decision rules. Maintaining the considerably lower volatility calibration of σa = 0.005 and
σσ
a
= 0.0025 in Sections A.2.1-A.2.3 allows us to solve the model under both monetary
policy specifications and decompose the relative contributions of the precautionary working
and contractionary bias channels.
Even for small increases in uncertainty, the temporary increase in the contractionary bias
produces large declines in output and its components. However, we choose to eliminate the
contractionary bias channel and assume that the monetary authority follows the history-
dependent rule in the main text of the paper. Mechanically, the history-dependent rule
allows us to solve our model using our baseline volatility of Table 1.1. In addition, we
believe the increase in the contractionary bias at the zero lower bound produces implausibly
large declines in output and its components. We view the contractionary bias channel as a
technical consequence of examining changes in uncertainty at the zero lower bound under a
particular simple monetary policy rule. Therefore, we focus our main analysis of uncertainty
at the zero lower bound on the more economically interesting precautionary working and
savings channel.
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Figure A.1: Demand Uncertainty Shock Under Alternative Policy Rules
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Figure A.2: Nominal Interest Rate Distribution with Zero Lower Bound Constraint
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Figure A.3: Simple Monetary Policy Rules & Fisher Relation with Zero Lower Bound
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Forward Guidance Under Uncertainty
B.1 Derivations of Approximated Model
B.1.1 Approximation of Consumption Euler Equation
This section provides a detailed derivation of the equations from Section 2.2. Using the con-
sumption Euler equation in Equation (2.1), complete the following steps to derive Equations
(2.2) or (2.9):
1. Multiply and divide the right side of the Euler equation by the steady state values
of the real interest rate RR and consumption C raised to the power −σ. Apply
the natural logarithm and exponential functions inside the conditional expectations.
Denote Xˆt = log(Xt/X) to write the variables in log-deviations from steady state.
1 = Et
{
βRRt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ}
= Et
{(
RRt
RR
)(
Ct
C
)σ (Ct+1
C
)−σ}
150
Appendix B Forward Guidance Under Uncertainty
1 = Et
{
exp
(
log
(
RRt
RR
)
− σlog
(
Ct+1
C
)
+ σlog
(
Ct
C
))}
1 = Et
{
exp
(
RˆRt + σCˆt − σCˆt+1
)}
2. Factor out the time t variables outside of the conditional expectations, reorganize,
and take the logarithm of both sides.
1 = Et
{
exp
(
RˆRt + σCˆt
)
exp
(
−σCˆt+1
)}
(
exp
(
RˆRt + σCˆt
))−1
= Et
{
exp
(
−σCˆt+1
)}
−RˆRt − σCˆt = log
(
Et
{
exp
(
−σCˆt+1
)})
3. Replace exp
(
−σCˆt+1
)
with its Taylor series expansion around Cˆt+1 = 0 and take
conditional expectations at time t.
−RˆRt − σCˆt = log
(
Et
{
1− σCˆt+1 + 12σ
2Cˆ2t+1 − σ3Cˆ3t+1 + . . .
})
−RˆRt − σCˆt = log
(
1− σEtCˆt+1 + 12σ
2EtCˆ2t+1 − σ3EtCˆ3t+1 + . . .
)
4. Define Z = σEtCˆt+1 − 12σ2EtCˆ2t+1 + σ3EtCˆ3t+1 − O
(
C4t+1
)
and use the Taylor series
expansion of log(1− Z) = −Z − (1/2)Z2 − (1/3)Z3 −O (Z4) to expand the previous
equation. To compute a second-order approximation, drop all terms that are third-
order or above. Reorganize the remaining terms to form the conditional variance
VartCˆt+1 = EtCˆ2t+1 −
(
EtCˆt+1
)2
.
−RˆRt − σCˆt = −σEtCˆt+1 +
1
2
σ2VartCˆt+1
Cˆt = EtCˆt+1 − 1
σ
RˆRt −
1
2
σVartCˆt+1
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5. Denote variables in logs using lowercase letters and normalize steady state consump-
tion C to equal one to derive Equation (2.2):
ct = Et ct+1 − 1
σ
(
rrt − rr
)
− 1
2
σVart ct+1
To derive the third-order approximation in Equation (2.9), retain the third-order terms in
Step 4 and reorganize the remaining terms to form the conditional skewness SkewtCˆt+1 =
EtCˆ3t+1 − 3EtCˆ2t+1EtCˆt+1 +
(
EtCˆt+1
)3
.
B.1.2 Derivation of Higher-Order New-Keynesian Model
In this section, I outline the derivation of the approximate higher-order New-Keynesian
model from Section 2.2. To simplify the derivations, I assume that the exogenous process
for at follows an autoregressive process in logs and the household utility function is addi-
tively separable in consumption and leisure. To derive Equations (2.4) - (2.6), I combine a
second-order approximation of the household Euler equations with a first-order approxima-
tion of the remaining model equations. Clearly, this approach neglects some higher-order
terms that are present in a complete second-order approximation of the underlying model.
However, the approximations in this section provide analytical tractability which is unavail-
able when examining the model equations in their original nonlinear form. In Section 2.4,
I show that the intuition from these approximations is consistent with the computational
results using the full nonlinear model. To derive Equations (2.4) - (2.6), complete the
following steps:
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1. Apply Steps 1 - 5 from Appendix B.1.1 to the consumption Euler equations for real
and nominal bonds and the Euler equation for the natural real interest rate. Use the
law of motion log (at+1) = (1− ρa) log (at) + σaεt+1 to write at+1 as function of at
and εt+1. Impose Etεt+1 = 0 and Etε2t+1 = 1.
1 = Et
{(
β
at+1
at
)(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
RRt
}
1 = Et
{(
β
at+1
at
)(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ Rt
Πt+1
}
1 = Et
{(
β
at+1
at
)
RNt
}
−RˆRt − σCˆt + (1− ρa) aˆt = log
(
Et
{
exp
(
σaεt+1 − σCˆt+1
)})
−Rˆt − σCˆt + (1− ρa) aˆt = log
(
Et
{
exp
(
σaεt+1 − σCˆt+1 − Πˆt+1
)})
−RˆNt + (1− ρa) aˆt = log
(
Et
{
exp
(
σaεt+1
)})
−RˆRt −σCˆt+(1− ρa) aˆt = −σEtCˆt+1+
1
2
σ2VartCˆt+1−σ (σa) Covt
(
Cˆt+1, εt+1
)
+
1
2
(
σ2
)2
(B.1)
− Rˆt − σCˆt + (1− ρa) aˆt = −σEtCˆt+1 − EtΠˆt+1 + 12σ
2VartCˆt+1 +
1
2
VartΠˆt+1
− σ (σa) Covt
(
Cˆt+1, εt+1
)
+ σCovt
(
Cˆt+1, Πˆt+1
)
− σaCovt
(
Πˆt+1, εt+1
)
+
1
2
(
σ2
)2
(B.2)
− RˆNt + (1− ρa) aˆt =
1
2
(
σ2
)2 (B.3)
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2. Subtract Equation (B.1) from Equation (B.2). Also, subtract Equation (B.3) from
Equation (B.1).
−RˆRt + RˆNt − σCˆt = −σEtCˆt+1 +
1
2
σ2VartCˆt+1 − σ (σa) Covt
(
Cˆt+1, εt+1
)
−Rˆt + RˆRt = −EtΠˆt+1 +
1
2
VartΠˆt+1 + σCovt
(
Cˆt+1, Πˆt+1
)
− σaCovt
(
Πˆt+1, εt+1
)
3. After reorganizing and dividing by σ, the resulting equations can be written as follows:
Cˆt = EtCˆt+1 − 1
σ
(
RˆRt − RˆNt
)
− 1
2
σVartCˆt+1 + (σa) Covt
(
Cˆt+1, εt+1
)
(B.4)
RˆRt = Rˆt+−EtΠˆt+1 +
1
2
VartΠˆt+1 +σCovt
(
Cˆt+1, Πˆt+1
)
−σaCovt
(
Πˆt+1, εt+1
)
(B.5)
4. Under the assumption of separable utility from consumption and leisure, Equations
(2.10) and (2.11) are now modified as follows:
ηatC
−σ
t = λt (B.6)
χatN
η
t = λt
Wt
Pt
(B.7)
η is now the inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity and χ is a constant which pins down
steady state hours worked.
5. Using a first-order linear approximation of Equations (B.6), (B.7), (2.14), (2.15),
the aggregate production function, and the national income accounting identity, the
following equations can be derived:
xt = Yˆt = Cˆt = µNˆt (B.8)
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WˆRt = Ξˆt = −µˆt = (η + σµ) Nˆt =
η + σµ
µ
xt (B.9)
Πˆt = βEtΠˆt+1 +
θ − 1
φp
Ξˆt = βEtΠˆt+1 +
θ − 1
φp
η + σµ
µ
xt (B.10)
Define κ as the slope of the Phillips curve in Equation (B.10).
6. To derive Equations (2.4) - (2.6) in the main text, combine the results from Equations
(B.8) - (B.9) and Equations (B.4) - (B.5). In addition, use lowercase variables to
denote log variables and normalize steady state output Y and consumption C to
equal one. For clarity of exposition, I omit the two additional covariance terms in
Equations (B.4) and (B.5) which are related to the specific exogenous process for the
preference shocks in the main text. The coefficients on these terms are very small and
they do not provide any additional intuition. Hence, I replace the equality sign with
the approximately equal sign in the main text to reflect these omissions.
B.2 Numerical Solution Method
To analyze the impact of uncertainty on the effectiveness of forward guidance, I solve the
model using the policy function iteration method of Coleman (1990). This global approx-
imation method allows me to model the occasionally-binding zero lower bound constraint.
This section provides the details of the algorithm when monetary policy follows a price-level
targeting rule of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). The algorithm is implemented using the
following steps:
1. Discretize the state variables of the model: {at × Pt−1}
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2. Conjecture initial guesses for the policy functions of the model Nt = N(at, Pt−1),
Πt = Π(at, Pt−1), Rt = R(at, Pt−1), and RRt = RR(at, Pt−1).
3. For each point in the discretized state space, substitute the current policy functions
into the equilibrium conditions of the model. Use interpolation and numerical inte-
gration over the exogenous state variable at to compute expectations for each Euler
equation. This operation generates a nonlinear system of equations. The solution to
this system of equations provides an updated value for the policy functions at that
point in the state space. The solution method enforces the zero lower bound for each
point in the state space and in expectation.
4. Repeat Step (3) for each point in the state space until the policy functions converge
and cease to be updated.
I implement the policy function iteration method in FORTRAN using the nonlinear equation
solver DNEQNF from the IMSL numerical library. When monetary policy follows an alternative
specification, the state variables and Euler equations are adjusted appropriately.
B.3 Optimal Monetary Policy Under Commitment
The optimal monetary policy maker under commitment aims to maximize the representative
household’s utility subject to the constraints of the economy. Some of the constraints
include expectations of future variables. Following Khan, King and Wolman (2003), I
introduce lagged Lagrange multipliers to make the solutions time-invariant. The augmented
156
Appendix B Forward Guidance Under Uncertainty
Lagrangian for the optimal policy problem under commitment can be written as follows:
L = min
{ωt+s}∞s=0
max
{dt+s}∞s=0
Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
βs
(
at+s
at
) (Cηt+s (1−Nt+s)1−η)1−σ
1− σ
+ω1t+s
(
Yt+s − Ct+s − φP2
(
Πt+s
Π
− 1
)2
Yt+s
)
+ω2t+s
(
Nt+s − Φ− Yt+s
)
+ω3t+s
(
WRt+s −
1− η
η
Ct+s (1−Nt+s)−1
)
+ω4t+s
(
(θ − 1)− θWRt + φP
(
Πt+s
Π
− 1
)(
Πt+s
Π
))
×
(
at+sC
η(1−σ)−1 (1−Nt+s)(1−η)(1−σ) Yt+s
)
−ω4t+s−1
(
φP
(
Πt+s
Π
− 1
)(
Πt+s
Π
))(
at+sC
η(1−σ)−1 (1−Nt+s)(1−η)(1−σ) Yt+s
)
+ω5t+s
(
at+sC
η(1−σ)−1 (1−Nt+s)(1−η)(1−σ)R−1t+s
)
−ω5t+s−1
(
at+sC
η(1−σ)−1 (1−Nt+s)(1−η)(1−σ) Π−1t+s
)
+ω6t+s
(
Rt+s − 1
)}
,
where dt =
{
Yt, Ct, Nt,W
R
t ,Πt, Rt
}
is the set of decision variables and
ωt = {ω1t, ω2t, ω3t, ω4t, ω5t, ω6t} is the vector of Lagrange multipliers. The final constraint
imposes the zero lower bound constraint since the gross nominal policy rate Rt must be
greater than or equal to one. After solving for the first-order conditions, the optimal
policy problem is solved using the algorithm outlined in Appendix B.2. To determine the
157
Appendix B Forward Guidance Under Uncertainty
equilibrium real interest rate RRt , I also include the Euler equation for a zero net supply real
bond as well. The algorithm solves for the policy functions for Nt = N(at, ω4t−1, ω5t−1),
Πt = Π(at, ω4t−1, ω5t−1), Rt = R(at, ω4t−1, ω5t−1), RRt = RR(at, ω4t−1, ω5t−1),
ω4t = ω4(at, ω4t−1, ω5t−1), and ω5t = ω5(at, ω4t−1, ω5t−1) on a discretized state space for
{at × ω4t−1 × ω5t−1}.
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Real Fluctuations at the Zero Lower
Bound
C.1 Numerical Solution Method
To analyze the impact of real shocks at the zero lower bound, I solve the model using the
policy function iteration method of Coleman (1990). This global approximation method
allows me to model the occasionally-binding zero lower bound constraint. This section
provides the details of the algorithm when monetary policy follows a standard Taylor (1993)-
type policy rule. The algorithm is implemented using the following steps:
1. Discretize the state variables of the model: {at × Zt × θt ×Gt}
2. Conjecture initial guesses for the policy functions of the model Nt = N(at, Zt, θt, Gt),
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Πt = Π(at, Zt, θt, Gt), and RRt = R
R(at, Zt, θt, Gt).
3. For each point in the discretized state space, substitute the current policy functions
into the equilibrium conditions of the model. Use interpolation and numerical inte-
gration over the exogenous state variables at, Zt, θt, Gt to compute expectations for
each Euler equation. This operation generates a nonlinear system of equations. The
solution to this system of equations provides an updated value for the policy functions
at that point in the state space. The solution method enforces the zero lower bound
for each point in the state space and in expectation.
4. Repeat Step (3) for each point in the state space until the policy functions converge
and cease to be updated.
I implement the policy function iteration method in FORTRAN using the nonlinear equation
solver DNEQNF from the IMSL numerical library. When monetary policy follows an alternative
specification, the state variables and Euler equations are adjusted appropriately.
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